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Introduction
The United States Department of Defense initiated military
commissions as authorized by the Military Commissions Act
("MCA") of 2006 to try "unlawful enemy combatants" detained in
the course of the War on Terror.1 Enacted on October 17, 2006,
the MCA's specific purpose is "to try alien unlawful enemy
combatants engaged in hostilities against the United States for
violations of the law of war and other offenses triable by military
commission."2 Congress passed the MCA as a renewed attempt at
convening military commissions in response to the Supreme
Court's ruling in Hamdan v. Rumsfeld,3 where the Court held that
the President's initial attempt at trying detainees 4 before military

t. Regents Professor of Law and Fredrikson & Byron Professor of Law,
University of Minnesota. The author wishes to thank Kieran Dwyer, Jared
Shepherd, and Mary Rumsey for their assistance with this article as well as
Michael J. Berrigan, Maj. Robert Cohen, Col. Dwight Sullivan, and the JEHT
Foundation for their support and encouragement. © 2008 David Weissbrodt &
Andrea W. Templeton.
tt. J.D. expected 2008, University of Minnesota Law School; M.P.P. expected
2008, Hubert H. Humphrey School of Public Affairs; B.A. 2004, Middlebury College.
The author would like to thank the board and staff of Law & Inequality: A Journal
of Theory and Practicefor their excellent work.
1. Military Commissions Act (MCA) of 2006, Pub. L. No. 109-366, sec. 3, §
948b(a), 120 Stat. 2601, 2602 (2007) (to be codified at 10 U.S.C. § 948b).
2. Id. § 948b, 120 Stat. at 2602.
3. 126 S. Ct. 2749 (2006).
4. Much has been written about the Bush administration's efforts to establish
military commissions to try detainees. See generally INTERNATIONAL LAW
CHALLENGES: HOMELAND SECURITY AND COMBATING TERRORISM (Thomas McK.
Sparks & Glenn M. Sulmasy eds., 2006); JOSEPH MARGULIES, GUANTANAMO AND
THE ABUSE OF PRESIDENTIAL POWER (2006); NAT'L INST. MILITARY JUSTICE,
ANNOTATED GUIDE: PROCEDURES FOR TRIALS BY MILITARY COMMISSIONS OF
CERTAIN NON-UNITED STATES CITIZENS IN THE WAR AGAINST TERRORISM (2002);
Keith S. Alexander, In the Wake of September 11th: The Use of Military Tribunals
to Try Terrorists, 78 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 885 (2003); Laura A. Dickinson, Using
Legal Process to Fight Terrorism: Detentions, Military Commissions, International
Tribunals, and the Rule of Law, 75 S. CAL. L. REV. 1407 (2002); Joan Fitzpatrick,
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commissions was not authorized either by congressional power or
the President's war powers.'
The Secretary of Defense published the Manual for Military
Commissions of January 18, 2007 ("the Manual"), in accordance
with the MCA, to govern the commissions' proceedings. The
Manual sets forth guidelines' for trials of detained "unlawful
enemy combatants" 7 at Guantinamo Bay and other U.S. detention
Jurisdictionof Military Commissions and the Ambiguous War on Terrorism, 96 AM.
J. INT'L L. 345 (2002); Instructions for Military Commissions on Trying Aliens
Charged with Terrorism, 97 AM. J. INT'L L. 706 (Sean D. Murphy, ed.) (2003);
Harold Hongju Koh, The Case Against Military Commissions, 96 AM. J. INT'L L. 337
(2002); Michael J. Matheson, U.S. Military Commissions: One of Several Options,
96 AM. J. INT'L L. 354 (2002); Daryl A. Mundis, The Use of Military Commissions to
Prosecute IndividualsAccused of TerroristActs, 96 AM. J. INT'L L. 320 (2002); Diane
F. Orentlicher & Robert Kogod Goldman, When Justice Goes to War: Prosecuting
Terrorists Before Military Commissions, 25 HARV. J.L. & PUB. POLY 653 (2002);
Jordan J. Paust, AntiterrorismMilitary Commissions: CourtingIllegality, 23 MICH.
J. INT'L L. 1 (2001); Jordan J. Paust, Antiterrorism Military Commissions: The Ad
Hoc DOD Rules of Procedure, 23 MICH. J. INT'L L. 677 (2002); Alfred P. Rubin,
Applying the Geneva Conventions: Military Commissions, Armed Conflict, and AlQaeda, 26 FLETCHER F. WORLD AFF. 79 (2002); Carl Tobias, Detentions, Military
Commissions, Terrorism, and Domestic Case Precedent, 76 S. CAL. L. REV. 1371
(2003); Juan R. Torruella, On the Slippery Slopes of Afghanistan: Military
Commissions and the Exercise of PresidentialPower, 4 U. PA. J. CONST. L. 648
(2002); U.S. Department of Defense Rules on Military Commissions, 96 AM. J. INT'L
L. 731 (Sean D. Murphy ed., 2002); Ruth Wedgwood, Al Qaeda, Terrorism, and
Military Commissions, 96 AM. J. INT'L L. 328 (2002); Richard J. Wilson, Can U.S.
Courts Learn from Failed Terrorist Trials by Military Commission in Turkey and
Peru?, 11 HuM. RTS. BRIEF 11 (2003); ABA Task Force on Terrorism and the Law,
Report and Recommendations on Military Commissions, ARMY LAW., Mar. 2002, at
8.
5. Hamdan, 126 S. Ct. at 2753-55.
6. U.S. DEP'T OF DEFENSE, MANUAL FOR MILITARY COMMISSIONS, pt. II, R.
103(a)(24) (2007), available at http://www.defenselink.mil/pubs/pdfs/The%20
Manual%20for%20Military%20Commissions.pdf [hereinafter MMC]. The Manual
contains four parts: Preamble, Rules for Military Commissions, Military
Commission Rules of Evidence, and Crimes and Elements.
7. Under Rule 103(a)(24), "Unlawful Enemy Combatant" means:
(A) a person who has engaged in hostilities or who has purposefully and
materially supported hostilities against the United States or its cobelligerents who is not a lawful enemy combatant (including a person who
is part of the Taliban, [A]l Qaeda, or associated forces); or
(B) a person who, before, on, or after the date of the enactment of the
Military Commissions Act of 2006, has been determined to be an unlawful
enemy combatant by a Combatant Status Review Tribunal or another
competent tribunal established under the authority of the President or the
Secretary of Defense.
Id. pt. II, R. 103(a)(24). In June 2007, a military commission dismissed charges
against a detainee because the prosecution had failed to show that the detainee,
despite being an enemy combatant, was an unlawful enemy combatant. United
States v. Ihadr, Order on Jurisdiction (U.S. C.M. Comm'n, June 4, 2007), available
at http://www.defenselink.mil/news/j un2007/khadrJudgesDismissalOrder(June%
204).pdf. On appeal, the United States Court of Military Commission Review
remanded the case to the original commission indicating that the trial judge had to
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sites. Pursuant to these guidelines, U.S. military prosecutors
renewed their effort to charge detainees and bring them to trial.8
Prosecutors now face the task of bringing the detainees to justice
amidst their already prolonged detention and international
pressure to comply with human rights and international
humanitarian law obligations.9
Intense political debate continues over which rules of U.S.
and international law should apply to those detained in the course
of hostilities in the War on Terror and how the detainees should be
handled."
Trying and convicting these detainees requires
protection of the right to a fair trial for both political and legal
reasons. The United States considers itself a leader in promoting
human rights-to cease protection of fair trial rights would
damage the United States' reputation.
Furthermore, human
rights treaties obligate the United States to guarantee the right to
a fair trial.
If the United States fails to provide fair trial
protections to current detainees, U.S. soldiers captured in future
conflicts may be unfairly treated.
In light of these considerations, sources of international law,
such as the Geneva Conventions and the International Covenant
on Civil and Political Rights ("Civil and Political Covenant")," can
provide necessary guidance for military commissions to protect fair
trial rights. This Article explores how international human rights
law can assist in navigating fair trial issues raised in the
application and interpretation of the Manual for Military

fully consider the prosecution's evidence regarding a detainee's alleged unlawful
status before deciding the "critical jurisdictional matter." United States v. Khadr,
No. 07-001, at 20 (U.S. Ct. Mil. Comm'n Rev. Sept. 24, 2007), available at
http://www.defenselink.mil/news/Sep2007/KHADR%2ODecision%20(24%20Sep%20
07)(25%20pages).pdf; see also William Glaberson, Court Advances Military
Tribunals for Detainees, N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 25, 2007, at Al (describing the trial
court and appellate decisions in the case of Canadian detainee Omar Ahmed
Khadr).
8. See, e.g., Glaberson, supra note 7, at Al.
9. See Theodor Meron, The Humanization of HumanitarianLaw, 94 AM. J.
INVL L. 239, 266 (2000) (stating that human rights law should be a part of the
interpretation and application of international humanitarian law, specifically in
the case of "regularly constituted courts" under Common Article 3); see also The
Military Commissions Act and the Continued Use of Guantdnamo Bay as a
Detention Facility: Hearing Before the House Committee on Armed Services, 110th
Cong. (2007) (written testimony of Elisa Massimino, Washington Director, Human
Rights First) (discussing the negative effects of the manner and prolonged nature of
the Guantdnamo Bay detentions).
10. See supra note 4 and accompanying text.
11. International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, Mar. 23, 1976, 999
U.N.T.S. 171 (signed by the United States on Oct. 5, 1977; ratified on June 5, 1992)
[hereinafter Civil and Political Covenant].
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Commissions. Part I of the Article looks at the different legal
statuses of the defendants before military commissions and the
international law applicable to their proceedings. Part II analyzes
the judicial guarantees necessary for a regularly constituted court
under international law and Common Article 3. Part III explores
whether military commissions uphold judicial guarantees
"recognized as indispensable by civilized peoples." 2 Finally, Part
IV considers the role for international law in interpreting the
Manual and sets forth the consequences of failing to provide
internationally recognized fair trial guarantees.
This Article demonstrates that the Manual fails to assure a
regularly constituted court that protects the requisite judicial
guarantees. In order to provide these guarantees, the Manual
should be interpreted in light of U.S. treaty obligations.
Interpreting the Manual in such a way will help satisfy the United
States' international obligations, preserve consistency in domestic
and international law, protect those responsible for the trials from
prosecution in other countries for human rights violations, and
possibly protect U.S. soldiers captured in future conflicts.
I.

Who the Detainees Are and What Law Applies to Them
A. The Legal Statuses of the Defendants and Applicable
Law

The War on Terror encompasses a number of international
and non-international conflicts-the primary conflicts being in
Afghanistan and Iraq. 3 Beginning on October 7, 2001, the United
States bombed and sent troops to Afghanistan in response to the
September 11, 2001 attacks by Al Qaeda on the United States. 4
The scope of the War on Terror increased dramatically with the
inception of the war in Iraq on March 20, 2003, when an
international coalition led by the United States invaded Iraq in an
effort "to disarm Iraq of weapons of mass destruction, to end
Saddam Hussein's support for terrorism, and to free the Iraqi
people."15
In both Afghanistan and Iraq, the United States
12. E.g. Geneva Convention for the Amelioration of the Condition of the
Wounded and Sick in Armed Forces in the Field art. 3, Aug. 12, 1949, 6 U.S.T.
3114, 3116-18, 75 U.N.T.S. 31, 32-34 [hereinafter First Geneva Convention];
accord infra notes 19-23 and accompanying text; see also MMC, supra note 6
(Executive Summary).
13. See MARGUILES, supra note 4, at 3.
14. See id.
15. President George W. Bush, Radio Address: President Discusses Beginning
of
Operation
Iraqi
Freedom
(Mar.
22,
2003),
available
at
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captured and detained enemy combatants; the United States now
faces the dilemma of what to do with these detainees.' 6
In order to try detainees, it is necessary to understand their
status in international law. The specific rights of detainees
depend on who they are and which international law applies to
them. The first year of the Afghan conflict-October 7, 2001 to7
June 9, 2002-qualifies as an international armed conflict.'
Therefore, Taliban prisoners taken during the international armed
conflict qualify as prisoners of war ("POWs") covered under the
Third Geneva Convention. 8 Individuals detained in Afghanistan
following the close of this conflict were taken in the context of a
non-international armed conflict and are thus covered under
Article 3, common to all four Geneva Conventions." Individuals
taken during the initial stages of the war on Iraq are either
covered under the Third Geneva Convention ("POW Convention")
if they are POWs2" or under the Fourth Geneva Convention if they
are civilians."' A 2005 United Nations Security Council decision
declared the Iraq conflict to be officially over;2 2 thus defendants
taken in the context of the Iraq war after 2005 are covered under
Common Article 3,23 which deals with internationalized civil wars
and other conflicts not falling within Common Article 2 of the
Geneva Conventions. Further, some detainees who were initially
detained outside of these conflicts, those detained in Bosnia for
example,24 are now under United States' control and are thus
http://www.whitehouse.gov/news/releases/2003/03/ 20030322.html.
16. See, e.g., Adam Liptak, The Line Between Civilian and Soldier, N.Y. TIMES,
June 13, 2007, at A15.
17. See Jelena Pejic, TerroristActs and Groups: A Role for InternationalLaw?,
75 BRIT. Y.B. INT'L L. 71, 76 (2004).
18. See Geneva Convention Relative to the Treatment of Prisoners of War art.
4, Aug. 12, 1949, 6 U.S.T. 3316, 3318-20, 75 U.N.T.S. 135, 138-40 [hereinafter
POW Convention]. Note, however, that this definition assumes the prisoner is part
of the Taliban or regular army. The POW Convention would not apply to Al Qaeda
or non-combatants, though Article 5 of the POW Convention gives them the same
type of protection. Id. at 140-42.
19. First Geneva Convention, supra note 12, at 32-34; Geneva Convention for
the Condition of Wounded, Sick, and Shipwrecked Members of Armed Forces at Sea
art. 3, Aug. 12, 1949, 6 U.S.T. 3217, 3220-22, 75 U.N.T.S. 85, 86-88 [hereinafter
Second Geneva Convention]; POW Convention, supra note 18, at 136-38; Geneva
Convention Relative to the Protection of Civilian Persons in Time of War art. 3,
Aug. 12, 1949, 6 U.S.T. 3516, 3518-20, 75 U.N.T.S. 287, 288-90 [hereinafter Fourth
Geneva Convention]. For the remainder of this Article, these articles collectively
will be referred to as "Common Article 3."
20. POW Convention, supra note 18, at 138-40.
21. Fourth Geneva Convention, supra note 19, at 288-90.
22. S.C. Res. 1637, U.N. Doc. S/RES/1637 (Nov. 11, 2005).
23. Common Article 3, supra note 19.
24. See, e.g., Boudellaa v. Bosnia & Herzegovina, Decision on Admissibility and
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covered under the Civil and Political Covenant" and customary
international law.26
B. FairTrial Rights Apply Universally
The defendants' differing legal statuses are irrelevant for the
purposes of fair trial standards in international humanitarian and
human rights law. The same standards for the purposes of fair
trial rights apply in all cases: all defendants should receive a fair
trial by a competent court. The U.S. Supreme Court decided in
Hamdan v. Rumsfeld that Common Article 3's guarantees govern
the relevant fair trial provisions for military commissions, and the
Court did not exclude the consideration of other bodies of
international law. 7 Hamdan'sinterpretation of Common Article 3
Merits, Case No. CH/02/8679, Human Rights Chamber for Bosnia and
Herzegovina, Oct. 11, 2002,
333. Extraordinary rendition is one source of
detention outside of these conflicts. The New York Times editorial board has
referred to extraordinary rendition as "the morally and legally unsupportable
United States practice of transporting foreign nationals to be interrogated in other
countries known to use torture and lacking basic legal protections." Editorial,
Supreme Disgrace,N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 11, 2007, at A30.
25. Civil and Political Covenant, supra note 11, at arts. 10(3), 14(4). The
United States has argued that since Guantdnamo Bay is not located within U.S.
territory, the Civil and Political Covenant does not apply to its treatment of
detainees. See Leslie C. Green, Is There a "New" Law of Intervention and
Occupation?, in INTERNATIONAL LAW CHALLENGES: HOMELAND SECURITY AND
COMBATING TERRORISM, supra note 4, at 174-75. Article 2(1) of the Covenant
indicates that a State party is obligated to respect and ensure the rights of the
Covenant "to all individuals within its territory and subject to its jurisdiction."
Civil and Political Covenant, supra note 11, at art. 2(1) (emphasis added); see U.N.
Human Rights Comm., Considerationof Reports Submitted by States PartiesUnder
Article 40 of the Covenant: United States of America,
130, U.N. Doc.
CCPR/CIUSA/3 (Nov. 28, 2005). The Human Rights Committee has, however,
determined that a person need not be located within the territory of a State party
in order for that State party to have obligations to that person; the person must
merely be "within the power or effective control" of the State party. U.N. Human
Rights Comm., General Comment No. 31, Nature of the GeneralLegal Obligation on
States Parties to the Covenant, 1 10, U.N. Doc. CCPR/C/21/Rev.l/Add.13 (May 26,
2004). While the United States does not concur with this interpretation, the
Human Rights Committee made it clear in reviewing the U.S. report in July 2006
that "effective control" would be the authoritative standard for evaluating U.S.
conduct in Guantdnamo and elsewhere.
See U.N. Human Rights Comm.,
Consideration of Reports Submitted by States Parties Under Article 40 of the
Covenant: Concluding Observations of the Human Rights Committee, United States
of America, J 10, U.N. Doc. CCPR/C/USA/CO/3/Rev.1 (Dec. 18, 2006).
26. Customary international law includes the right to a "fair trial affording all
essential judicial guarantees" and is examined in detail by the International Red
Cross in 1 CUSTOMARY INTERNATIONAL HUMANITARIAN LAW 352 (Jean-Marie
Henckaerts & Louise Doswald-Beck eds., 2005).
27. Hamdan v. Rumsfeld, 126 S. Ct. 2749, 2795-96 (2006); see also Curtis A.
Bradley, The Military Commissions Act, Habeas Corpus, and the Geneva
Conventions, 101 AM. J. INT'L L. 322, 343 (2007) (advocating deference to Congress
and the President because "it is far from clear that the military commissions as
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takes its foundation from Article 75 of the first Additional
Protocol,2" the Civil and Political Covenant,29 and customary
international law.
Furthermore, the Court of Military
Commissions Review declared that "[the United States is a
signatory nation to all four Geneva Conventions. The Geneva
Conventions are generally viewed as self-executing treaties, . . .
form a part of American law, and are binding in federal courts
under the Supremacy Clause."" These sources of international
law contain in-depth and interrelated fair trial standards.
The following provisions illustrate the similarity of fair trial
standards in humanitarian and international human rights law:
Common Article 3, which governs armed conflicts not of an
international character;3' the POW Convention, which governs
international armed conflicts;32 Article 75 of the First Additional

authorized by the MCA violate [C]ommon Article 3"); Patrick 0. Gudridge, An AntiAuthoritarian Constitution? Four Notes, 91 MINN. L. REV. 1473, 1500-01 (2007)
(analyzing the independence of the military commissions' procedures as a response
to Hamdan); Gregory E. Maggs, Enemy CombatantsAfter Hamdan v. Rumsfeld, 75
GEO. WASH. L. REV. 971, 986 (2007) (explaining how the MCA "strives to eliminate
objections under the Third Geneva Convention"); Stephen A. Saltzburg, A Different
War: Ten Key Questions About the War on Terror, 75 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 1021,
1028-31 (2007) (arguing that the military commissions are not regularly
constituted courts but are unique types of tribunals); Jennifer Trahan, Military
Commission Trials at Guantanamo Bay, Cuba: Do They Satisfy Internationaland
ConstitutionalLaw?, 30 FORDHAM INT'L L.J. 780, 820-21 (2007) (finding difficulty
in construing the MCA provisions in harmony with Common Article 3 and noting
that without being regularly constituted courts, such military commissions would
constitute a war crime).
28. Protocol Additional to the Geneva Conventions of 12 August 1949, and
Relating to the Protection of Victims of International Armed Conflicts (Protocol 1),
1125 U.N.T.S. 3, June 8, 1977 [hereinafter Additional Protocol]. The Protocol has
not been ratified by the United States, but this has not prevented the Supreme
Court from relying on it to interpret the meaning of Common Article 3 of the
Geneva Conventions. See Hamdan, 126 S. Ct. at 2796.
29. Hamdan, 126 S. Ct. at 2797 n.66 (Stevens, J., concurring) (citing the Civil
and Political Covenant as an additional source of legal protections mirroring those
under Article 75).
30. United States v. Khadr, No. 07-001, at 4 n.4 (U.S. Ct. Mil. Comm'n Rev.
Sept. 24, 2007), available at http://www.defenselink.mil/news/Sep2007/KHADR%20
Decision%20(24%2OSep%2007)(25%20pages).pdf. For the difficulties found when
defendants attempt to invoke treaty provisions that are not self-executing, see the
U.S. Supreme Court Decision in Medellin v. Texas. No. 06-984, 2008 WL 762533
(Mar. 25, 2008) (holding that an International Court of Justice's ("ICJ's") decision
that the United States had violated the Vienna Convention on Consular Relations
was not directly enforceable domestic federal law that preempted state limitations
on filing of successive habeas petitions and that a Presidential memo requiring
state courts to give effect to the ICJ's decisions did not independently require states
to reconsider and review the defendant's claims without regard to state procedural
default rules).
31. Common Article 3, supra note 19.
32. POW Convention, supra note 18.

Law and Inequality

[Vol. 26:353

Protocol, which also governs international armed conflicts;33 and
Article 14 of the Civil and Political Covenant, which governs civil
and political rights in general.14 Common Article 3 to the Third
and Fourth Geneva Conventions requires:
In the case of an armed conflict not of an international
character occurring in the territory of one of the High
Contracting Parties, each Party to the conflict shall be bound
to apply, as a minimum, the following provisions [prohibiting]:
(d) the passing of sentences and the carrying out of
executions without previous judgment pronounced by a
regularly constituted court affording all the judicial
guarantees which are recognized as indispensable by civilized
people.35
Fair trial provisions also derive from Article 75(4) of Additional
Protocol I, which states: "No sentence may be passed and no
penalty may be executed on a person found guilty of a penal
offence related to the armed conflict except pursuant to a
conviction pronounced by an impartial and regularly constituted
court respecting the generally recognized principles of regular
judicial procedure . . . ."" Article 75(4) then lists judicial
guarantees considered fundamental to a fair trial under customary
international law.37 Article 14 of the Civil and Political Covenant
similarly guarantees the right "to a fair and public hearing by a
competent, independent and impartial tribunal established by
law."38 Hence, countries that wish to prosecute anyone for war
crimes must provide a "regularly constituted court" that affords
"all the judicial guarantees which are recognized as indispensable

33. Additional Protocol, supra note 28, at art. 75.
34. Civil and Political Covenant, supra note 11, at art. 14.
35. Common Article 3, supra note 19. Common Article 3 was considered by the
drafters as proclaiming "the guiding principle common to all four Geneva
Conventions, and from it each of them derives the essential provision around which
it is built." OSCAR M. UHLER ET AL., INT'L COMM. OF THE RED CROSS, COMMENTARY:
IV GENEVA CONVENTION RELATIVE TO THE PROTECTION OF CIVILIAN PERSONS IN
TIME OF WAR 14 (Jean S. Pictet ed., 1958); see also Derek Jinks, Protective Parity
and the Laws of War, 79 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 1493, 1508 (2004) (outlining the
purpose of Common Article 3 and arguing that the principles embodied therein
"would pierce the veil of sovereignty").
36. Additional Protocol, supra note 28, at art. 75(4). See generally Jelena Pejic,
ProceduralPrinciples and Safeguards for Internment/AdministrativeDetention in
Armed Conflict and Other Situations of Violence, 87 INVL REV. RED CROSS 375,
377-80 (2005) (setting forth the sources of customary international law in times of
conflict).
37. See Additional Protocol, supra note 28, at art. 75(4)(a)-(j).
38. Civil and Political Covenant, supra note 11, at art. 14; see also Human
Rights Comm., General Comment No. 32, $[$ 15-29, U.N. Doc. CCPR/C/GC/32 (Aug.
23, 2007) [hereinafter Gen. Comm. 32]. The Human Rights Committee adopted
General Comment Number 32 in 2007 to replace General Comment Number 13.
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by civilized peoples."39
C. Guidance from Courts-Martial
The practices of courts-martial may provide additional
guidance for interpreting the Manual. The POW Convention
requires POWs to be tried by court-martial; therefore, courtsmartial under the Uniform Code of Military Justice ("UCMJ")
generally provide a regularly constituted court, affording judicial
guarantees as directed by Common Article 3.40 It would benefit
military commissions to draw on the fundamental principles of
courts-martial when interpreting the Manual's provisions.4'
II. What Is a Regularly Constituted Court?
Under the Civil and Political Covenant, a regularly
constituted court must at a minimum be independent and
impartial.4"
The requirement of independence protects a
defendant's right to judges that are not subject to political
influence.'
Impartiality requires judges to be free of "personal

39. Common Article 3, supra note 19; see also OSCAR M. UHLER ET AL., supra
note 35, at 14; Anthony Cullen, Key Developments Affecting the Scope of Internal
Armed Conflict in InternationalHumanitarianLaw, 183 MIL. L. REV. 66, 81 (2005)
("Article 3 which is common to all four Geneva Conventions of 12 August 1949
defines certain rules to be applied in the armed conflict of a non-international
character. There is no doubt that [... I these rules also constitute a minimum
yardstick [... and they are rules which, in the [opinion of the International Court
of Justice], reflect what the Court in 1949 called 'elementary considerations of
humanity.'" (alterations in original) (quoting Military and Paramilitary Activities
(Nicar. v. U.S.), 1986 I.C.J. 4, 114 (June 29) (Merits))).
40. For more on the application of international law to this conflict, including
discussion of military commissions and courts-martial, see David Glazier, Full and
Fair by What Measure?: Identifying the International Law Regulating Military
Commission Procedure, 24 B.U. INT'L L.J. 55, 71-76 (2006) (acknowledging that
U.S. service personnel could be tried under military commissions, which he states
would "differ from a court-martial in nomenclature only," but finding complications
when military commissions are structured to exclude U.S. citizens under their
jurisdiction).
41. For a more detailed analysis of how court-martial standards flow with
international human rights standards in an actual military commission, see Brief
for Respondent Omar Khadr Supporting Petitioners at 27-30, Al Odah v. United
States, 2008 WL 695615 (2008) (No. 06-1196), 2007 WL 2428374.
42. Civil and Political Covenant, supra note 11, at art. 14. For a discussion of
judicial procedural guarantees see infra Part III.
43. See U.N. Human Rights Comm., Consideration of Reports Submitted by
States Parties Under Article 40 of the Covenant: Concluding Observations of the
Human Rights Committee: Slovakia, $ 18, U.N. Doc. CCPR/C/79/Add.79 (Aug. 4,
1997). The Human Rights Committee has the authority to review country
compliance with the Civil and Political Covenant, which it does through periodic
review and the issuance of Concluding Observations on country situations. Civil
and Political Covenant, supra note 11, at art. 40.
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bias or prejudice"" and viewed as impartial based on a country's
domestic statutes.45
In interpreting the Civil and Political
Covenant, the Human Rights Committee notes that jurisdiction of
military courts over civilians may raise serious problems
regarding
"the
equitable,
impartial
and
independent
administration of justice. 4 6
In the past, the United States vocally criticized military
tribunals for their tendency towards bias and appearance of being
subject to executive pressure.4 7 Aspects of the current military
commissions that are likewise questionable under international
law include the commissions' ability to try individuals for acts that
may not have been illegal when they were committed,' the
creation of the commissions after the crimes were committed, the
creation of the commissions for specific individuals, and the use of
military officers to preside over commissions. 9 Allowing military
officers to prosecute and judge their enemies in the War on Terror
raises a question of judicial impartiality heightened by the fact
that Congress created these commissions specifically for that

44. Gen. Comm. 32, supra note 38,
21 (citing Karttunen v. Finland, U.N.
Human Rights Committee, Communication No. 387/1989,
7.2, U.N. Doc.
CCPR/C/46/D/387/1989 (1992)).
45. Id.
46. Id.
22. See generally William W. Burke-White, A Community of Courts:
Toward a System of InternationalCriminal Law Enforcement, 24 MICH. J. INT'L L.
1, 22-23 (2002) ("Military tribunals, depending on their structure and rules, may
well violate core principles of international law, such as the right-enshrined in
numerous international conventions-to a fair trial before an independent arbiter."
(citation omitted)).
47. See Burke-White, supra note 46, at 23 ("The need for transparency,
procedural regularity, and conformity with international obligations advises
against the use of military tribunals."); see also Human Rights Watch, Fact Sheet:
Past
U.S.
Criticism
of
Military
Tribunals
(Nov.
28,
2001),
http://www.hrw.org/press/2001/ll/tribunalsll28.htm (last visited Mar. 29, 2008).
In fact, the former chief prosecutor for the military commissions resigned in
October 2007, and among his criticisms of the system were that the Pentagon was
asserting too much power over the prosecutor's office. William Glaberson, War
Crimes Prosecutor Quits in Pentagon Clash, N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 6, 2007, at A13.
48. Military commissions may punish individuals for offenses, such as
conspiracy and "providing material support for terrorism," that do not appear to
have been criminal acts under U.S. law prior to the adoption of the MCA and were
not considered war crimes under international humanitarian law.
Military
Commissions Act (MCA) of 2006, Pub. L. 109-366, sec. 3, § 950v(b)(25)(A), 120 Stat.
2601, 2630 (2007) (to be codified at 10 U.S.C. § 950v(b)(25)(A)). Article 15 of the
Civil and Political Covenant provides: "No one shall be held guilty of any criminal
offence on account of any act or omission which did not constitute a criminal
offence, under national or international law, at the time when it was committed."
Civil and Political Covenant, supra note 11, at art. 15.
49. See generally Koh, supra note 4, at 338-42 (describing deficiencies in the
new military commissions).
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purpose. 5 In addition, the military tries to take away civilian
status from certain detainees by declaring them "unlawful enemy
combatants."5 Unfortunately for the military, that status does not
exist under international humanitarian law: either the detainees
are POWs entitled to a trial by court-martial or they are civilians
For these reasons, military
entitled to a civilian court.52
commissions do not qualify as "regularly constituted court[s]"
required by Common Article 353 or as "competent, independent and
impartial tribunal[s] established by law" required by the Civil and
Political Covenant.'
In Hamdan v.Rumsfeld, a majority of the Supreme Court
defined a "regularly constituted court" for purposes of Common
Article 3 as one "established and organized in accordance with the
laws and procedures already in force in a country."55 A "regularly
constituted court" should therefore be understood as a tribunal
employing the rules and procedures applicable in trial by courtsmartial absent some "practical need" justifying deviation from
court-martial practice.56 Because the principal "need" justifying
the procedures used by military commissions under the MCA is
apparently the "need" to secure convictions using tainted
evidence,7 military commissions do not constitute regularly
constituted courts.
Military commissions are also not regularly constituted
courts "established in accordance with laws and procedures

50. For a definition of "unlawful enemy combatants," see supra note 7.
51. Id.
52. See infra Part III.E.1.
53. Common Article 3, supra note 19.
54. See U.N. Human Rights Comm., Consideration of Reports Submitted by
States Parties Under Article 40 of the Covenant: Concluding Observations of the
Human Rights Committee: Colombia, $ 18, U.N. Doc. CCPR/C/79/Add.76 (May 3,
1997) (expressing concern that the broadened concept of service-related acts
enabling the prosecution of civilians in military courts may result in human rights
violations because of doubts about the independence and impartiality of military
tribunals); see also U.N. Econ. & Soc. Council [ECOSOC], Issue of the
Administration of Justice through Military Tribunals, T1 15, U.N. Doc.
E/CN.4/Sub.2/2003/4 (June 27, 2003) (preparedby Emmanuel Decaux) (noting that,
by removing civilians from ordinary courts and making them subject to special
jurisdiction, "the equality of arms between the parties to the proceedings cannot be
observed, nor can the principle of the impartiality of the tribunal be established");
Gen. Comm. 32, supra note 38, 9122 (noting that jurisdiction of military courts over
civilians may raise serious problems as far as the "equitable, impartial and
independent administration of justice is concerned").
55. Hamdan v. Rumsfeld, 126 S. Ct. 2749, 2797 (2006).
56. Id.
57. See, e.g., Emily Bazelon, Tortured Rationale, SLATE, Dec. 7, 2005,
http://www.slate.com/id/2131782/ (last visited Apr. 10, 2008).
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already in force in a country, '"" as required by Hamdan, because
they are ex post facto.5" Some alleged offenses took place before
the MCA was adopted in 2006. Unlike the Nuremberg tribunals,
which were presaged by the Hague Convention of 1907,0 military
commissions under the MCA prosecute newly defined offenses
under newly defined jurisdiction over a new category of
individuals in a foreign country.
Traditionally, military
commissions have prosecuted war crimes without triggering ex
post facto concerns, because the offenses tried were already known
under international law."1 In contrast, despite its claim that it
merely codifies existing offenses, the MCA adds new crimes to
those previously known in international law. 62 This ex post facto
prosecution violates the U.S. Constitution,63 the Civil and Political
Covenant,64 the Additional Protocol,65 and Common Article 3.66
Military commissions may also violate Common Article 3's
regularly constituted court requirement because they are newly
established and the judges/commission members are selected after
the accused has been detained and the government has indicated
its intent to prosecute. When a judge and/or finder of fact has
been selected under such circumstances, justice cannot be done or
at least cannot appear to be done. In defining a regularly
58. Hamdan, 126 S. Ct. at 2797.
59. See Jack M. Beard, The Geneva Boomerang: The Military Commissions Act
of 2006 and U.S. CounterterrorOperations, 101 AM. J. INT'L L. 56, 61 (2007) (noting
that the inclusion of new war crimes in the MCA could pose an ex post facto
problem for U.S. officials under other countries' domestic legal systems); Mark A.
Drumbl, The Expressive Value of Prosecutingand Punishing Terrorists: Hamdan,
the Geneva Conventions, and International Criminal Law, 75 GEO. WASH. L. REV.
1165, 1192-93 (2007) (finding that the MCA's definition of grave breaches of
Common Article 3 "expands upon the preexisting content of substantive
international criminal law, triggering ex post facto concerns"); Charles H. Rose III,
Criminal Conspiracy and the Military Commissions Act: Two Minds That May
Never Meet, 13 ILSA J. INT'L & COMP. L. 321, 326-27 (2007) (finding an ex post
facto problem with the MCA's changing of the definition of conspiracy). But see
Hamdan, 126 S. Ct. at 2764-65 (holding that merely changing the identity of a
tribunal after the fact does not pose a retroactivity problem).
60. See, e.g., Theodor Meron, Revival of Customary InternationalLaw, 99 Am.
J. Int'l L. 817-19 (noting that the Nuremberg Tribunals resulted in the acceptance
of the Hague Convention as customary international law).
61. Rose, supra note 59, at 326-27.
62. See Beard, supra note 59, at 61; Drumbl, supra note 59, at 1192-93; Sean
Riordan, Military Commissions in America? Domestic Liberty Implications of the
Military Commissions Act of 2006, 23 TOURO L. REV. 575, 602-03 (2007).
63. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 9, cl. 3.
64. Civil and Political Covenant, supra note 11, at art. 15. The prohibition of ex
post facto prosecution is non-derogable, in recognition of the fundamental nature of
this requirement for a regularly constituted court and a fair trial. Id. at art. 4.
65. Additional Protocol, supra note 28, at art. 75(4)(c).
66. Common Article 3, supra note 19.
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constituted court, the Civil and Political Covenant requires that
"everyone shall be entitled to a fair and public hearing by a
competent, independent and impartial tribunal established by
law." 7 Unlike courts-martial, the procedures of the military
commissions were principally established to try detainees who
were incarcerated prior to the adoption of the MCA. Judges in
courts-martial are detailed to a bench and hear cases as they arise,
regardless of the issue.68 They establish their independence and
impartiality as they handle diverse cases. Such independence and
impartiality cannot be established in the context of the military
commissions.
III. Judicial Guarantees Under the Military Commissions
A. Required JudicialGuarantees Under Common Article 3
A regularly constituted court under Common Article 3"9 must
accord "judicial guarantees which are recognized as indispensable
by civilized peoples"7 that reflect an "evolving standard" of fair
trial norms based on customary international human rights law.71
Internationally recognized fair trial rights" include:

67. Civil and Political Covenant, supra note 11, at art. 14.
68. See Uniform Code of Military Justice (UCMJ), art. 26(a), 10 U.S.C. § 826
(2000).
69. Common Article 3, supra note 19; see OSCAR M. UHLER ET AL., supra note
35, at 14; see also Additional Protocol, supra note 28, at art. 14; Hamdan v.
Rumsfeld, 126 S. Ct. 2749 (2006).
70. Derek Jinks, The Declining Significanceof POW Status, 45 HARV. INT'L L.J.
367, 406-10 (2004) (suggesting that the use of military tribunals instead of
"regularly constituted court[s]" and the relaxed due process protections of tribunal
proceedings violate Common Article 3); Derek Jinks & David Sloss, Is the President
Bound by the Geneva Conventions?, 90 CORNELL L. REV. 97, 119-20 (2004)
("[Common Article 3 establishes] an evolving standard that, by design, tracks
relevant customary international law." (citation omitted)).
71. Jinks, supra note 70, at 406-10.
72. Id. at 409 ("Article 75 requires, in all circumstances, trials by impartial and
regularly constituted courts that, at a minimum, afford the presumption of
innocence; the right to counsel before and during trial; the right of defendants to be
present at proceedings, call witnesses, and examine witnesses against them; the
right to be promptly informed of the charges or reasons for detention; the right to a
public judgment; and the right of defendants not to testify against themselves or to
confess their guilt, among other rights."); see also William W. Burke-White,
Regionalization of International Criminal Law Enforcement: A Preliminary
Exploration, 38 TEX. INT'L L.J. 729, 760 (2003) (finding core judicial rights
embedded in the Civil and Political Covenant, the Inter-American Convention on
Human Rights, the Cairo Declaration on Human Rights in Islam, the African
Charter on Human and People's Rights, and the European Human Rights
Convention).
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1. the presumption of innocence,73
2. the right to counsel of choice before and after trial,74
3. the right of defendants not to testify against themselves or
to confess their guilt,75
4. the right to a speedy trial, including the right to be
promptly informed of charges or reasons for detention,76
5. the defendant's right to confront evidence and witnesses,77
including the defendant's right
a. to be present at proceedings,"

73. See Additional Protocol, supra note 28, at art. 75(4)(d); Gen. Comm. No. 32,
supra note 38, 30.
10 (citing Kennedy v. Trinidad &
74. Gen. Comm. No. 32, supra note 38,
7.10,
Tobago, U.N. Human Rights Committee, Communication No. 845/1998,
U.N. Doc. CCPR/C/74/D/845/1998 (2002), Henry v. Trinidad & Tobago, U.N.
Human Rights Committee, Communication No. 752/1997, 1 7.6, U.N. Doc.
CCPR/C/64/D/752/1997 (1998), Taylor v. Jamaica, U.N. Human Rights Committee,
8.2, U.N. Doc. CCPR/C/62/D/705/1996 (1998),
Communication No. 707/1996,
Shaw v. Jamaica, U.N. Human Rights Committee, Communication No. 704/1996, 1
7.6, U.N. Doc. CCPR/C/62/D/704/1996 (1998), and Currie v. Jamaica, U.N. Human
13.4, U.N. Doc.
Rights Committee, Communication No. 377/1989,
CCPR/C/50/D/377/1989 (1994)). These Human Rights Committee cases derive from
communications submitted pursuant to the Optional Protocol to the International
Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, opened for signature, Dec. 19, 1966, 999
U.N.T.S. 302. As of March 5, 2008, 111 countries were parties to the Optional
(last updated
Protocol, http://www2.ohchr.org/englishlbodies/ratification/5.htm
to the Covenant,
were parties
2008), and 161 nations
Mar. 5,
http://www2.ohchr.org/english/bodies/ratification/4.htm (last updated Mar. 5, 2008).
See UNITED NATIONS, MULTILATERAL TREATIES DEPOSITED WITH THE SECRETARY-

GENERAL, Optional Protocol to the International Covenant on Civil and Political
Rights, at 235, U.N. Doc. STILEG/SER.E/25, U.N. Sales No. E.07.V3 (2007).
38 (citing Kurbonov v. Tajikistan, U.N.
75. Gen. Comm. 32, supra note 38,
Human Rights Committee, Communication No. 1208/2003, IT 6.2-6.4, U.N. Doc.
CCPR/C/86/D/1208/2003 (2006), Shukurova v. Tajikistan, U.N. Human Rights
U.N.
Doc.
8.2-8.3,
1044/2002,
No.
Communication
Committee,
CCPR/C/86/D/1044/2002 (2006), Singarasa v. Sri Lanka, U.N. Human Rights
U.N.
Doc.
7.4,
1033/2001,
No.
Communication
Committee,
CCPR/C/811D/1033/2001 (2004), Deolall v. Guyana, U.N. Human Rights
5.1, U.N. Doc. CCPR/C/82/D/912/2000
Committee, Communication No 912/2000,
(2004), and Kelly v. Jamaica, U.N. Human Rights Committee, Communication No.
5.5, U.N. Doc. CCPR/C/411D/253/1987 (1991)); see also Additional
253/1987,
Protocol, supra note 28, at art. 75(4)(f).
27 (citing Mufioz Hermoza v. Peru, U.N.
76. Gen. Comm. 32, supra note 38,
Human Rights Committee, Communication No. 203/1986, 1 11.3, U.N. Doc. Supp.
No. 40 (A/44J40) (1988) and Fei v. Columbia, U.N. Human Rights Committee,
8.4, U.N. Doc. CCPR/C/53/D/514/1992 (1995)); see
Communication No. 514/1992,
also Additional Protocol, supra note 28, at art. 75(4)(a).
77. Gen. Comm. 32, supra note 38, IT 36, 39; see also Additional Protocol, supra
note 28, at art. 75(4)(g); DAVID WEISSBRODT, THE RIGHT TO A FAIR TRIAL
(forthcoming 2008) (manuscript at 53-57, on file with author) (revising DAVID
WEISSBRODT, THE RIGHT TO A FAIR TRIAL (2001) and outlining other rights
regarding witnesses).
78. Gen. Comm. 32, supranote 38, 36.
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b. to call witnesses,79 and
°
c. to examine witnesses against him/herself,
6. the right to a public forum,8 1 most importantly a public
judgment," and
7. the right to an appeal,83 in the form of
a. a challenge to the legality of detention,84 and
b. the right to review by a higher court.85
In order to meet Common Article 3's requirement of a regularly
constituted court, any court or tribunal must, at a minimum,
provide for the above rights and judicial guarantees,' the
analogous requirements of the Civil and Political Covenant, or
those of Article 75 of Additional Protocol I to the Geneva
Conventions.
Secretary of Defense Robert Gates demonstrably intended

79. Id. 39.
80. Id.
81. Id. 9T 28-29 (citing Kavanagh v. Ireland, U.N. Human Rights Committee,
Communication No. 819/1998, T1 10.4, U.N. Doc. CCPR/C/76/D/111412002 (2002)
(pre-trial decisions), Van Meurs v. Netherlands, U.N. Human Rights Committee,
Communication No. 215/1986,
6.2, U.N. Doc. CCPR/C/39/D/215/1986 (1990)
(regarding reasonable limits on public nature of trial proceedings), and R.M. v.
Finland, U.N. Human Rights Committee, Communication No. 301/1988, 1 6.4, U.N.
Doc. CCPR/C/35/D/301/1988 (1989) (regarding appellate hearings)).
82. Additional Protocol, supra note 28, at art. 75(4)(i).
83. Gen. Comm. 32, supra note 38, 9145 (citing Henry v. Jamaica, U.N. Human
Rights
Committee, Communication
No. 230/1987,
9 8.4, U.N. Doc.
CCPR/C/43/D/230/1987 (1991)).
84. Id.
85. Id.
86. See Fitzpatrick, supra note 4, at 345, 352 (noting that judicial guarantees
under the Civil and Political Covenant are non-derogable and that Human Rights
Committee General Comment 29 indicates that "the military commissions under
consideration here must comply with international humanitarian law and may not
deny fair trial rights where not strictly required"); Melysa H. Spetber, John Walker
Lindh and Yaser Esam Hamdi: Closing the Loophole in International
HumanitarianLaw for American Nationals CapturedAbroad While Fighting with
Enemy Forces, 40 AM. CRIM. L. REV. 159, 174-75 (2003) (commenting that the
requirements established by Common Article 3 are minimum standards that must
be met and should be viewed as inviting a greater level of protection); Luisa
Vierucci, Prisoners of War or Protected Persons Qua Unlawful Combatants? The
JudicialSafeguards to Which Guantanamo Bay Detainees Are Entitled, 1 J. INT'L
CRIM. JUST. 284, 307, 314 (2003) (noting that Common Article 3 sets out basic
judicial guarantees); cf. Derek Jinks, The Applicability of the Geneva Conventions to
the "Global War on Terrorism," 46 VA. J. INT'L L. 165, 185 (2005) ("[The dual
purposes of Common Article 3 are] the minimization of human suffering and the
respect for state sovereignty."). But see Curtis A. Bradley, Military Commissions
and Terrorist Enemy Combatants, 2 STAN. J. Civ. RTS. & CIv. LIBERTIES 253, 256
(2006) (arguing that indispensable guarantees are presumably less than courtmartial procedures and that the then current military commissions guarantee
extensive rights).
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His choice of

words tracks the language of Common Article 3 in several places,
including in the Executive Summary, which states: "[This Manual]
is intended to ensure that alien unlawful enemy combatants who
are suspected of war crimes and certain other offenses are
prosecuted before regularly constituted courts affording all the
judicial guarantees which are recognized as indispensable by
The Manual also notes in the Preamble that
civilized people."'
the rules "extend to the accused all the 'necessary judicial
guarantees' as required by [C]ommon Article 3V'89 Simply tracking
the language, however, is not sufficient to make the commissions
Compliance is achieved by constituting the
compliant.
commissions in a manner that follows the internationally accepted
While the
norms concerning regularly constituted courts. 90
Manual does protect certain rights, 91 it contains several provisions
which may not afford the procedural safeguards required for
compliance with Common Article 3. Problematic provisions relate
to the right to notice,92 the right to confront witnesses, 93 the right
to be present at trial,94 the right to a public trial,9" the right to
exclusion of evidence obtained
review by a higher court,' and the
97
through torture or ill-treatment.
B. Protected Rights
The Manual guarantees several rights necessary for the
military commissions to conform to internationally accepted
norms. Rule 920(e)(5)(A) of the Rules for Military Commissions
("R.M.C.") establishes the proper standard for findings. "The
accused must be presumed to be innocent until the accused's guilt
is established by legal and competent evidence beyond reasonable
,,98 No definition of competent evidence is given in the
doubt .
Manual. This particularly raises concerns if the evidence is

87. MMC, supra note 6 (Executive Summary).
88. Id.; see Common Article 3, supra note 19.
89. MMC, supra note 6, pt. I, § 2.

90. Common Article 3, supra note 19.
91.
92.
93.
94.
95.
96.
97.
98.

For example, the Manual protects the right to counsel. See infra Part III.B.
See infra Part III.C.
See infra Part III.D.1.
See infra Part III.D.2.
See infra Part III.D.3.
See infra Part III.E
See infra Part III.F.
See MMC, supra note 6, pt. II, R. 920(e)(5)(A).
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R.M.C. 910(c) provides
substantial protections regarding counsel for the defendant,
including the right to be represented by counsel,'0 0 though that
right may be hindered by restrictions invoked under the national
security privilege.'
Additionally, the new R.M.C. partially
guarantee the defendant's right not to testify against him or
herself through R.M.C. 910(a)(1), which allows the defendant to
plead not guilty.'02
9

C.

The Right to Notice

R.M.C. 308 addresses a defendant's right to notice and states:
"Upon the swearing of the charges and specifications, the accused
shall be informed of the charges against him as soon as
practicable." °3
The language "as soon as practicable" leaves
leeway for service of charges, especially considering that many of
the current detainees in U.S. custody have spent months, if not
years, detained without charges.0 4 Once a defendant is charged,
R.M.C. 707 provides adequate notice for pre-trial matters,
ensuring arraignment for the defendant within thirty days of
service of charges."' Thirty days for arraignment does not take
into account the days of detainment before charges are brought;
thus, the time between initial detention and trial may constitute
undue delay. The Human Rights Committee's interpretation of
"undue delay" varies in cases before it, but generally detention
without charges for over three years is found to violate
international norms."° Further, administrative difficulty has not
99. See infra Part III.F.
100. See MMC, supra note 6, pt. I, § l(f)(2), pt. II, R. 910(c).
101. See infra Part III.D.
102. See MMC, supra note 6, pt. II, R. 910(a)(1).
103. Id. pt. II, R. 308.
104. See, e.g., Andrew Gray, Guantanamo Trials on Track for Summer:
Pentagon, REUTERS, Feb. 28, 2007, http:www.reuters.com/articlePrint?articleId=
USN2816949620070228; Stephen Labaton, Court Endorses Curbs on Appeal by
U.S. Detainees, N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 21, 2007, at Al. Under U.S. law, prolonged
detention without trial or delayed trial is unconstitutional under the Sixth
Amendment. U.S. CONST. amend. VI. The appropriate remedy for violations of the
right to a speedy trial is the dismissal of charges. See Strunk v. United States, 412
U.S. 434 (1973); Barker v. Wingo, 407 U.S. 514 (1972). When a defendant is
detained without notice of charges, the federal courts and some states follow the
exclusionary rule of McNabb v. United States, 318 U.S. 332 (1943), and exclude any
statement that has a reasonable relationship to the unnecessary delay in
arraignment. The rule is not a constitutional one, and not all states adopt it. State
v. Wiberg, 296 N.W.2d 388, 393 (Minn. 1980). Rather the courts will consider it as
a factor in whether the evidence will be suppressed. Id.
105. See MMC, supra note 6, pt. II, R. 707.
106. See Morrison v. Jamaica, U.N. Human Rights Committee, Communication
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been accepted as an excuse for failure to give prompt notice." 7 The
Appeals Chamber for the International Criminal Tribunal for
Rwanda held that holding a suspect longer than twenty days
without notice of the charges was a violation of the suspect's
rights, as was holding a suspect longer than ninety days without
indictment.1"
In addition, prolonged detention without notification of
charges may have serious implications for a defendant's mental
capacity to stand trial at all."' The Third Geneva Convention
No. 635/1995, U.N. Doc. CCPR/C/63/D/635/1995-(1998) (not finding a violation of
prompt trial right when trial occurred approximately eighteen months after arrest
and delay included a preliminary inquiry); Leslie v. Jamaica, U.N. Human Rights
Committee, Communication No. 564/1993, U.N. Doc. CCPR/C/63/D/564/1993 (1998)
(finding no prompt trial when trial occurred twenty-nine months after arrest);
Borroso v. Panama, U.N. Human Rights Committee, Communication No. 473/1991,
U.N. Doc. CCPR/C/54/D/473/1991 (1995) (finding an undue delay between
indictment and trial when a murder suspect was held without bail for more than
three and a half years before his acquittal); Shalto v. Trinidad & Tobago, U.N.
Human Rights
Committee, Communication No. 447/1991, U.N. Doc.
CCPR/C/53/D/447/1991 (1995) (finding no prompt trial when there was a delay of
almost four years between the judgment of the court of appeal and the beginning of
the retrial, a period during which the petitioner was kept in detention); Bozize v.
Central African Republic, U.N. Human Rights Committee, Communication No.
428/1990, U.N. Doc. CCPRIC/50/D/428/1990 (1994) (finding that trial did not take
place within a "reasonable time:" military leader arrested in a foreign country,
repatriated, imprisoned, held incommunicado for a period, and mistreated, as well
as denied rights of access to counsel, of notice, and of prompt review of the legality
of his detention; he had not yet been formally charged, let alone tried, four years
after his arrest); see also WEISSBRODT, supra note 77 (manuscript at 45-47)
(examining cases brought before the Human Rights Committee for violation of the
undue delay provision of Article 14(3)(c)).
107. WEISSBRODT, supra note 77 (manuscript at 45) (citing Vivanco v. Peru, U.N.
Human Rights Committee,
Communication No. 678/1996, U.N. Doc.
CCPR/C/74/D/678/1996 (2002)).
108. Barayagwiza v. Prosecutor, Case No. ICTR-97-19, Decision,
109 (Nov. 3,
1999). Barayagwiza was held twenty-nine days without being notified of the
charges-nine days longer than allowed by rule 40bis of the tribunal. Id.
43. He
was also held for 233 days without being indicted-143 days longer than allowed by
rule 62 of the tribunal. Id. 45. Additionally, the International Criminal Tribunal
failed to provide the necessary review of his detention by not providing a habeas
corpus hearing. Id.
90. The court initially held that the appropriate remedy for
these violations of Barayagwiza's rights, especially the latter two, was his
immediate release and the dismissal of charges with prejudice. Id.
106. Upon
review, the prosecutor submitted new evidence which the court found "diminish[ed]
the role played by the failings of the Prosecutor as well as the intensity of the
violation of the rights of the Appellant." Prosecutor v. Barayagwiza, Case No.
ICTR-97-19-AR72, Decision on Prosecutor's Request for Review or Reconsideration,
71 (Mar. 31, 2000). The remedy was reduced to commuting the sentence from life
to thirty-five years imprisonment. Prosecutor v. Nahimana, Case No. ICTR-99-52T, Judgment and Sentence,
1107 (Dec. 3, 2003) (sentencing Barayagwiza at the
same time as other defendants).
109. See generally Joanna Dingwall, Unlawful Confinement as a War Crime: The
Jurisprudence of the Yugoslav Tribunal and the Common Core of International
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allows for detention during periods of international armed
conflict," ° though the terms and limits of detention have been
questioned in several international courts."' The new R.M.C.
909(b) presumes that the defendant has the capacity to stand
trial,"' establishing that a lack of mental capacity triggers a set of
rules suspending trial and sentencing."'
D. National Security Privilege:Jeopardizingthe Right to
Confront, the Right to be Present, and the Right to a
Public Trial
Two of the most troubling aspects of the new military
commissions are R.M.C. 701(f) and its companion the Military
Commissions Rules of Evidence ("M.C.R.E.") 505, which both
concern national security and the treatment of classified
information." 4 Information becomes classified for the purposes of
M.C.R.E. 505(b)(3) through an in camera proceeding, which may
exclude the defendant at the trial counsel's request, or may be
made ex parte, in writing, "outside the presence of the accused and
defense counsel."". National security may also be invoked under
R.M.C. 806(b)(2)(A), which authorizes closure of a session for the
Humanitarian Law Applicable to Contemporary Armed Conflicts, 9 J. CONFLICT &
SECURITY L. 133, 177 (2004) ("[Tlhe recognition that isolation may amount to cruel
treatment [is] evidence that inclusion of unlawful confinement as a war crime in
internal armed conflict has a basis in customary international law.").
110. See POW Convention, supra note 18, at arts. 17-20.
111. See Hamdi v. Rumsfeld, 542 U.S. 507, 535-36 (2004) (holding in part that
separation of powers principles do not bar the U.S. Supreme Court from reviewing
the executive branch's detention scheme for enemy combatants); see also Brogan v.
United Kingdom, 145 Eur. Ct. H.R. (ser. A) (1988) (challenging the detention
without charges of suspected terrorists); Ireland v. United Kingdom, 24 Eur. Ct.
H.R. (ser. A) (1978) (finding no violation in the event of arbitrary detention during
a public emergency).
112. See MMC, supra note 6, pt. II, R. 909(b).
113. See id. pt. II, R. 706 (inquiring into the mental capacity or mental
responsibility of the accused); id. pt. II, R. 906 (relating to mental capacity or
responsibility of the accused); id. pt. II, R. 916 (providing for lack of mental
responsibility as a defense); id. pt. II, R. 1102A (providing for post-trial hearing for
verdict of not guilty as a result of mental incapacity).
114. Id. pt. II, R. 701(f) ("Classified information shall be protected and is
privileged from disclosure if disclosure would be detrimental to the national
security. This rule applies to all stages of proceedings in military commissions,
including the discovery phase."); id. pt. III, R. 505.
115. MMC, supra note 6, pt. III, R. 505(b)(3). While the former chief prosecutor
for the military commissions Morris Davis defended the Manual rules by arguing
that "the [Military Commissions Act] gives the accused the right to be present for
all open sessions of the trial," he neglected to address the denial of an accused's
rights at the point where trial procedures are closed. See Morris D. Davis, In
Defense of Guantanamo Bay, 117 YALE L.J. POCKET PART 21, 30 (2007),
http://yalelawjournal.org/images/pdfs/579.pdf (last visited June 2, 2008).
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purpose of "protecting information the disclosure of which could
reasonably be expected to damage national security ....
While
generally a state possesses the right to exclude the press and
public
from
portions
of hearings
under
exceptional
circumstances, 117 these provisions, if taken to the extreme,
threaten a defendant's rights to confront the witnesses and
evidence against him, to be present at trial, and to have a public
trial.
1.

Right to Confront

The invocation of the national security privilege threatens a
defendant's right to confront the evidence and witnesses against
him."' While R.M.C. 701(f)(5) requires the prosecution to provide
the defense with an "adequate substitute""9 for classified
information, there is no discussion of what an adequate substitute

116. See MMC, supra note 6, pt. II, R. 806(b)(2)(A). This closure includes
information regarding "intelligence or law enforcement sources, methods, or
activities . . . ." Id.; cf. William Schabas, Fair Trials and National Security
Evidence, 4 INT'L COMMENT. ON EVID. (2006), http://www.bepress.com
/ice/vol4/issl/art9 (pointing to the danger of drawing inferences in international
criminal trials from state claims to withhold evidence on grounds of national
security).
117. See Civil and Political Covenant, supra note 11, at art. 14 (allowing for the
exclusion of the press and public for reasons of "public order (ordre public) or
national security in a democratic society"); see also United States ex rel. Knauff v.
Shaughnessy, 338 U.S. 537, 551 (1950) (Jackson, J., dissenting) ("In the name of
security the police state justifies its arbitrary oppressions on evidence that is secret
... ."). For more on accommodating national security via in camera inspection and
the exclusion of the general public, see POW Convention, supra note 18, at art. 105
(stating that in camera review should only be used in exceptional cases in "the
interest of State security"), Fourth Geneva Convention, supra note 19, at art. 74
("IA]s an exceptional measure, to be held in camera."), Rome Statute of the
International Criminal Court art. 68(2), July 17, 1998, 2187 U.N.T.S. 90 ("[T]o
protect victims and witnesses or an accused, [the court may] conduct any part of
the proceedings in camera."), and id. at art. 72 (regarding protection of national
security information).
118. For Human Rights Committee jurisprudence on the right to confront
witnesses, see Peart v. Jamaica, U.N. Human Rights Committee, Communication
Nos. 464/1991, 482/1991, U.N. Doc. CCPR/C/54/D/4641991 (1995) (finding a
violation where the prosecution failed to give defense access to a crucial witness
statement) and Pratt v. Jamaica,U.N. Human Rights Committee, Communication
Nos. 210/1986, 225/1987, U.N. Doc. A/44/40 at 222 (1989) (finding no violation
when defense lawyer's decision not to call a witness was a tactical one within the
professional judgment of the defense). For a detailed discussion of the right to
confront under U.S. jurisprudence in contemporary context, see Brian McEvoy,
Classified Evidence and the Confrontation Clause: Correcting a Misapplication of
the Classified Information Procedures Act, 23 B.U. INT'L L.J. 411, 411, 424-25
(2005) (focusing on the implications of United States v. Moussaoui, 382 F.3d 453,
482-83 (4th Cir. 2004), cert. denied, 544 U.S. 931 (2005)).
119. See MMC, supra note 6, pt. II, R. 701(f).
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would entail. 2 °
Presumably, it would be at the judge's
discretion. 121
If the military judge decides not to grant classified status to
the information at issue, R.M.C. 908 provides a complete and
expedited procedure for appeal by the United States. 22 A similar
provision is not available to the defendant; this raises the question
of whether these military commission procedures guarantee
"equality of arms," 2 3-the principle that prohibits any distinctions
between parties in procedural rights unless those distinctions are
"based on 24law and [can be justified] on objective and reasonable
grounds."1

120. A military judge may also use the Classified Information Procedures Act
("CIPA") as precedent in her decision whether or not to exclude the defendant from
access to classified information, but the case-by-case nature of limiting access and
the requirement of fairness in the decision transcends the switch from a
government employee issue to a terrorist suspect case. See generally DEP'T OF
JUSTICE, UNITED STATES ATTORNEY'S MANUAL,

CRIMINAL RESOURCE MANUAL §

2054, pt. II.B, available at http://www.usdoj.gov/usao/eousa/foia-reading-room/
usam/title9/ crm02054.htm ([T]he provision does not provide grounds for excluding
or excising part of a writing or recorded statement which ought in fairness to be
considered contemporaneously with it. Thus the court may admit into evidence
part of a writing, recording, or photograph only when fairness does not require the
whole document to be considered."); James Nicholas Boeving, The Right to be
Present Before Military Commissions and Federal Courts: Protecting National
Security in an Age of Classified Information, 30 HARv. J.L. & PUB. POLY 463, 556
(2007) (finding CIPA procedures have been upheld as consistent with the Sixth
Amendment right to confrontation); Joshua L. Dratel, Ethical Issues in Defending a
Terrorism Case: How Secrecy and Security Impair the Defense of a Terrorism Case,
2 CARDOZO PUB. L. POL'Y & ETHICS J. 81, 99-103 (2003) (analyzing CIPA and
finding constitutional errors in its use to deprive a defendant and its counsel of
access to information); McEvoy, supra note 118, at 422 ("[Tjhe question of whether
limiting access to cleared defense counsel is permissible will depend on the facts of
each case.").
121. See MMC, supra note 6, pt. II, R. 913(c)(4) (allowing a judge discretion to
"bring the matter to the attention of the parties [or,] in the interest of justice,
exclude the evidence without an objection by a party").
122. Id. pt. II, R. 908(d) ("Interlocutory appeal of orders or rulings related to the
protection of classified information, the closure of proceedings from the public, or
the exclusion of the accused from certain proceedings."). Such a review may not
result in a written opinion of the decision pursuant to R.M.C. 908(d)(2)(D), which
authorizes the Court of Military Commission Review to "dispense with the issuance
of a written opinion in rendering its decision." Id. pt. II, R. 908(d)(2)(D).
123. See Fei v. Colombia, U.N. Human Rights Committee, Communication No.
514/1992, U.N. Doc. CCPR/C/53/D/514/1992 (1995) (finding unequal treatment of
the parties and undue delay); Robinson v. Jamaica, U.N. Human Rights
Committee, Communication No. 223/1987, IT 2.1, 10.3-10.4, U.N. Doc. A/44/40
(1989) (finding inequality of arms as to witness access and lack of legal
representation).
124. See Gen. Comm. No. 32, supra note 38, T 9; see also Additional Protocol,
supra note 28, at art. 75(4)(g) ("Anyone charged with an offence shall have the right
to examine, or have examined, the witnesses against him and to obtain the
attendance and examination of witnesses on his behalf under the same conditions
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The use of the national security privilege to infringe on a
defendant's right to cross-examine witnesses also diverges from
the adequate provisions guaranteed by courts-martial. In courtsmartial, the accused has a broad right to cross-examine witnesses
against him-a right that is derived from principles of the Sixth
Amendment to the U.S. Constitution.125 The right to crossexamine may be narrowed by concerns such as "harassment,
prejudice, confusion of issues, witness safety, repetitiveness, or
marginal relevancy." 2 Courts-martial, despite dealing with cases
involving classified information and danger to witnesses, have no
provision for screening witnesses from the accused and defense
counsel. 27 Instead, the accused and defense counsel are aware of
the identity of the witness and are able to cross-examine
unhindered. 28
In short, the R.M.C. include a loophole that could prevent the
defendant from knowing who and where evidence came from and
by what means it was procured; this is problematic both under
international law and in light of the court-martial procedures that
could inform the process.'
Such information could well form the
crux of the government's case 3 and could be of questionable
reliability, particularly if there is reason to believe that the
evidence was procured by torture or ill-treatment.3'
The absence of such critical information would violate
international fair trial norms. 2 For example, the European Court
as witnesses against him."); Civil and Political Covenant, supra note 11, at art.
14(3)(e) (allowing the defendant the right "[t]o examine, or have examined, the
witnesses against him and to obtain the attendance and examination of witnesses
on his behalf under the same conditions as witnesses against him").
125. United States v. Velez, 48 M.J. 220, 226 (C.A.A.F. 1998).
126. Id.
127. See UCMJ, 10 U.S.C. §§ 801-946 (2000).
128. Id. art. 46, § 846.
129. Additionally, infringement on a defendant's confrontation right may raise
due process concerns. Pointer v. Texas, 380 U.S. 400, 404 (1965). The extent to
which these concerns are at issue for these particular defendants is beyond the
scope of this Article; however, if due process does apply it may override this
statutory analysis. Cf. Rasul v. Bush, 542 U.S. 466, 480-81 (2004).
130. See US: Mark Five Years of Guantanamo by Closing It, H.R. WATCH, Jan. 5,
2007, http://hrw.org/english/docs/2007/01/05/usdoml4974.htm; see also Gregory S.
McNeal, Unfortunate Legacies: Hearsay, Ex Parte Affidavits and Anonymous
Witnesses at the IHT, 4 INT'L COMMENT. ON EVID. (2006) http://www.bepress.com/
ice/vol4/issliart5.
131. The exclusionary rule for evidence procured by torture and ill-treatment is
discussed infra Part III.F.2.
132. See Civil and Political Covenant, supra note 11, at art. 14; Fourth Geneva
Convention, supra note 19, at arts. 3(1)(d), 72; POW Convention, supra note 18, at
art. 105; see also Delta v. France, 191 Eur. Ct. H.R. (ser. A) 6, 15-16 (1990) (holding
that domestic courts may not rely on evidence obtained from anonymous sources
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of Human Rights has interpreted the fair trial protections of the
European Convention of Human Rights to provide that an accused
should be given "an adequate and proper opportunity to challenge
and question a witness against him, either at the time the witness
was making 133his statement or at some later stage of the
proceedings."
2.

Right to be Present

The defendant's right to be present at trial is another right at
risk.'
Under court-martial procedures, "a military accused has
both a constitutional and a statutory right to be present during the
conduct of his trial." 35 The right to be present at one's trial is
derived from the Fifth Amendment of the U.S. Constitution and
from UCMJ article 39, which directs that "[p]roceedings . . . shall
be conducted in the presence of the accused."'36 Although the right
is not unlimited, the Supreme Court in Hamdan described the
right to be present as "one of the most fundamental protections
afforded not just by the Manual for Courts-Martial but also by the
UCMJ itself .
,,.7 Military Rule of Evidence ("M.R.E.") 505(i)
provides an example of the balance between the strong right to be
present and the need for security in courts-martial. Under this
that the defendant has not had the opportunity to challenge); Kostovski v.
Netherlands, 166 Eur. Ct. H.R. (ser. A) 4, 20 (1989).
133. Kostovski, 166 Eur. Ct. H.R. (ser. A) at 20; see also Delta, 191 Eur. Ct. H.R.
(ser. A) at 15. For an argument that military commissions' procedures as written
would not hinder a defendant in mounting an adequate defense, see Captain
Nikiforors Mathews, Beyond Interrogations:An Analysis of Protection Under the
Military Commissions Act of 2006 of Technical Classified Sources, Methods and
Activities Employed in the Global War on Terror, 192 MIL. L. REV. 81, 114-15
(2007).
134. For more Human Rights Committee jurisprudence on the right to be
present, see Wolf v. Panama,U.N., Human Rights Committee, Communication No.
289/1988, T 6.6, U.N. Doc. CCPR/C/44/D/289/1988 (1992) (finding a lack of fair trial
rights where the accused was not allowed to attend his trial or to give instructions
to his counsel and where the absence of a duly motivated indictment violates the
principle of the equality of arms) and Conteris v. Uruguay, U.N. Human Rights
Committee, Communication No. 139/1983, T 10, U.N. Doc. A/40/40 (1985) (finding a
violation where the accused was denied any opportunity to appear in person before
a judge and was subsequently convicted by a military tribunal in absentia). But see
Gordon v. Jamaica, U.N. Human Rights Committee, Communication No. 237/1987,
91 1, 6.2, 7, U.N. Doc. CCPR/C/46/D/237/1987 (1992) (finding no violation where
the accused was adequately represented by attorneys, though not physically
present himself).
135. United States v. Rembert, 43 M.J. 837, 838 (A. Ct. Crim. App. 1996).
136. UMCJ, 10 U.S.C. art. 39(a)(4) (2000). But see Boeving, supra note 120, at
571-77 (arguing for a flexible approach to the right to be present and advocating
for the use of military commissions as a possible forum for defendants who ought to
be denied access to portions of their trial).
137. Hamdan v. Rumsfeld, 126 S. Ct. 126 S. Ct. 2749, 2792 (2006).
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rule, trial counsel can move ex parte for an in camera review of
classified information, but if such a hearing is granted, the defense
has a right to be present and make arguments. 3 ' Similarly,
M.R.E. 505(g)(3) allows for an ex parte exclusion of classified
evidence, but only
if it is duplicative of statements already made
39
in open court. 1
Generally, R.M.C. 804 guarantees the defendant's right to be
present at all pertinent stages of trial with exceptions for
voluntary absence, express waiver, disruption of the court, and
national security.1 4 0 R.M.C. 702 and 703 assure the defendant's
right to call and cross-examine witnesses, and R.M.C. 906(b)(1)
allows the judge to grant a continuance should an essential
witness be unavailable.14 ' These provisions could ensure a fair
right to confront, but they are jeopardized by the national
security
4
privilege, through the same exclusions explained earlier.
3.

Right to a Public Trial

A third fair trial right at risk from the national security
privilege is the right to a public forum."
In its first General
Comment on Article 14, the Human Rights Committee stressed
the significance of publicity of hearings as "an important
safeguard in the interest of the individual and of society at
large." 4 4 While acknowledging exceptional circumstances under
138. MIL. R. EVID. 505(i); see also 10 U.S.C. art. 39(a), § 839.
139. MIL. R. EVID. 505(g)(3).
140. See MMC, supra note 6, pt. II, R. 804. Military judges are prohibited from
consulting with the Commission except in the presence of the accused. Id. pt. II, R.
502(c)(2); see also id. pt. II, R. 701(f) (classifying information if disclosure would be
detrimental to the national security).
141. Id. pt. II, R. 702, R. 703, R. 906(b)(1). R.M.C. 914A(a) also allows for the
use of remote live testimony for witnesses "whose presence at trial cannot be
procured by legal process." Id. pt. II, R. 914A(a).
142. See supra Part LI.D.1. See generally Jinks & Sloss, supra note 70, at 120
nn.117, 118 (analyzing provisions of the previous Department of Defense military
commissions that raise similar issues of confrontation as the current military
commissions).
143. See generally Van Meurs v. Netherlands, U.N. Human Rights Committee,
Communication No. 215/1986,
6.1, 6.2, U.N. Doc. A/45/40, vol. 2 (1990) (holding
that, where a party is entitled to a public trial, the court must make information
about time and venue of the proceedings available to the public and must provide
adequate facilities, within reasonable limits, for the attendance of interested
members of the public); Estrella v. Uruguay, U.N. Human Rights Committee,
Communication No. 74/1980, 10, U.N. Doc. A/38/40 (1983) (finding that a trial in
camera violates Article 14 if the State fails to provide a reason for not according a
public trial).
144. U.N. Human Rights Comm., General Comment 13, reprinted in U.N.
Secretariat, Compilation of General Comments and General Recommendations
Adopted by Human Rights Treaty Bodies,
6, U.N. Doc. HRI/GEN/L/Rev.1
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which courts have the power to exclude the public, the Committee
noted that hearings must be open to the public in generaljournalists included-and must not be limited to a particular
category of persons.'45 In rare cases when the public is excluded,
the Committee noted that the judgment must, except in strictly
defined circumstances, be made public. 146
While R.M.C. 806 provides for a "public trial" and R.M.C. 808
and 1103 concern the creation of a record of trial, both R.M.C. 806
and 1103 contain exceptions that limit a defendant's public trial
R.M.C. 806(a) notes that access to trials may be
right.1 47
constrained by national security concerns, 148 and 806(b)(2) provides
for closure of the trial to the public in the interests of national
security or to ensure the physical safety of individuals.'19 R.M.C.
1103(c) provides for security classification of each page "on which
classified material appears." 5 ° R.M.C. 1104(d)(B) requires the
convening authority to delete any classified or government
information from the defendant's copy of the record of trial,' and
R.M.C. 1104(d)(C) requires the attachment of a certificate listing
removed information."' Hence, when combined with the blanket
national security privileges of R.M.C. 701(f) and R.M.C.E. 505,153
the commission rules could serve to deprive the defendant of a
public record that accurately represents the trial and that holds
The lack of an
the government accountable for its case.
adequate record deprives the defendant of the right to appeal since
a defendant cannot appeal from an inadequate record. "
[hereinafter Gen. Comm. 13]. The Committee retained this language in General
Comment 32, which replaced General Comment 13. Gen. Comm. 32, supra note 38,

1 28.
145. Gen. Com. 13, supra note 144, T 6; see also Gen. Comm. 32, supra note 38, T1
29.
146. Gen. Com. 13, supra note 144, 6; see also Gen. Comm. 32, supra note 38, 91
29.
147. MMC, supra note 6, pt. II, R. 806, R. 808, R. 1103.
148. Id. pt. II, R. 806(a).
149. Id. pt. II, R. 806(b)(2).
150. Id. pt. II, R. 1103(c).
151. Id. pt. II, R. 1104(d)(B).
152. Id. pt. II, R. 1104(d)(C).
153. See supra Part III.D.1 (discussing the treatment of classified information
under R.M.C. 701(f) and R.M.C.E. 505).
154. In examining cases under Article 14(1), the Human Rights Committee has
held that a public opinion must be in writing. See, e.g., Touron v. Uruguay, U.N.
Human Rights Committee, Communication No. R.7/32, [$ 2.1, 12, U.N. Doc.
A/36/40 (1981) (finding Article 14 violations in the case of a defendant who had not
been allowed to attend the hearing of his case, whose trial was not held in public,
and who had never received the texts of any court decisions).
155. See id. (finding that, in the absence of a judgment in writing, the Human
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Right to Review

Another important fair trial guarantee necessary for a
regularly constituted court is the right to review by a higher court.
While the current military commissions contain improved appeal
procedures as compared with the original 2002 commissions, they
lack adequate protections for the right to appeal or explicit habeas
corpus procedures." 6
1.

Habeas Corpus

The Manual does not directly address habeas corpus
considerations; they appear only once-in the discussion section
following R.M.C. 202, which deals with "[plersons subject to the
jurisdiction of the military commissions." 7
According to the
Manual, military commissions only have personal jurisdiction over
"alien unlawful enemy combatants." 8 The Combatant Status
Review Tribunal ("C.S.R.T.") process, which "provides detainees
with the opportunity to challenge their status," determines an
individual's status as an alien unlawful enemy combatant. 5 9 The
MCA deems that status dispositive for purposes of personal
jurisdiction."6 Accordingly, in theory, a defendant will already
Rights Committee could not examine whether the proceedings or the severity of the
sentence complied with the Covenant); Henry v. Jamaica, U.N. Human Rights
Committee, Communication No. 230/1987,
8.4, U.N. Doc. CCPR/C/43/D/230/1987
(1991) (holding that the accused has a right to access duly reasoned written
judgments within a reasonable time for all instances of appeal). But see Bailey v.
Jamaica, U.N. Human Rights Committee, Communication No. 709/1996,
7.4,
U.N. Doc. CCPR/C/66/D/709/1996 (1999) (finding that an oral decision and written
notes were sufficient for a written judgment).
156. See Fitzpatrick, supra note 4, at 345 & n.2 (outlining issues regarding the
legality of the appeals process under the November 13, 2002 order, which negated
the possibility of a review of the outcome of military commission proceedings).
157. The Supreme Court has granted certiorari to review the denial of habeas
corpus actions brought by detainees. Boumediene v. Bush, 127 S. Ct. 3078 (2007).
The Supreme Court heard oral arguments in the case on Dec. 5, 2007. Emily
Bazelon, Don't Know Much About History, SLATE,
Dec.
4,
2007,
http://www.slate.com/id/2179174/.
158. See MMC, supra note 6, pt. II, R. 202(b) note (citing 10 U.S.C. § 948(c)
(2006)). The limited use of military commissions solely for alien combatants may
violate the POW Convention's requirement that military commissions also be used
or be able to be used to try U.S. soldiers. See Timothy C. MacDonnell, Military
Commissions and Courts-Martial: A Brief Discussion of the Constitutional and
JurisdictionalDistinctionsBetween the Two Courts, ARMY LAW., Mar. 2002, at 19,
32.
159. MMC, supra note 6, pt. II, R. 202(b) note.
160. Id.
At least one military commission, however, has questioned a
defendant's classification as an unlawful enemy combatant, dismissing the charges
for lack of jurisdiction. See United States v. Khadr, Order on Jurisdiction (U.S. Ct.
Milit. Comm'n, June 4, 2007), available at http://www.defenselink.mill
news/jun2007/khadrJudgesDismissalOrder(June%204).pdf.
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have had the opportunity to challenge his or her detention prior to
coming before a military commission. In fact, a defendant's status
is questionable, as the C.S.R.T. process inherently violates the
POW Convention.1 61 A larger problem is the deprivation of the
right to habeas corpus for these detainees under the Detainee
Treatment Act. 162
Article 9(4) of the Civil and Political Covenant guarantees
detainees the right to habeas corpus. "Anyone who is deprived of
his liberty by arrest or detention shall be entitled to take
proceedings before a court, in order that that court may decide
without delay on the lawfulness of his detention and order his
release if the detention is not lawful." 63 The Human Rights
Committee notes:
The right of a person deprived of her liberty to take
proceedings before a court to challenge the lawfulness of her
detention is a substantive right, and entails more than the
right to file a petition-it contemplates a right for a proper
review by a court of the lawfulness of the detention."
A detainee must also be able to challenge a detention that violates
the Covenant. Judicial review under Article 9(4) is "not limited to
mere compliance of the detention with domestic law but must
include the possibility to order release if the detention is

161. In determining a detainee's status, the C.S.R.T. review asks whether the
detainee is an "unlawful enemy combatant" under 10 U.S.C. § 948a(1)(ii) (2006).
See MMC, supra note 6, pt. II, R. 202(b) note. This is not the correct question
under the POW Convention, which requires a review of a detainee's status under
Article 4 of the POW Convention. See POW Convention, supra note 18, at arts. 45.
162. Detainee Treatment Act, Pub. L. No. 109-163, § 1405(e), 119 Stat. 3477
(2006) (codified as amended sections in 28 U.S.C. § 22401 (2005)) ("[N]o court,
justice, or judge shall have jurisdiction to hear or consider--(1) an application for a
writ of habeus filed by or on behalf of an alien detained ... at Guantanamo Bay,
Cuba; or (2) any other action against the United States ... relating to any aspect of
the detention . . . of an alien at Guantanamo Bay, Cuba, who--(A) is currently in
military custody; or (B) has been determined.., to have been properly detained as
an enemy combatant."); see also Labaton, supra note 104, at Al, A17 (discussing
the MCA's explicit elimination of federal court jurisdiction over habeas challenges
by Guantdnamo prisoners).
163. See Civil and Political Covenant, supra note 11, at art. 9(4).
164. Smirnova v. Russian Federation, U.N. Human Rights Committee,
Communication No. 712/1996,
10.1, U.N. Doc. CCPR/C/81/D/712/1996 (2004). In
this case, the accused was detained on fraud charges and she challenged the
lawfulness of her detention. Id. 9192.2, 4. A judge received her petition for release
on September 1, 1995 and rejected the petition in an ex parte decision on
September 13, 1995. Id.
10.1. Because of the lack of proper review and the
accused's lack of access to a court, the Committee found a violation of the right to
be brought promptly before a judge under Article 9(3) of the Civil and Political
Covenant. Id. 91 10.1, 10.2; see Civil and Political Covenant, supra note 11, at art.
9(3).

Law and Inequality

[Vol. 26:353

incompatible with the requirements of the Covenant."'65
2.

Right to Review by a Higher Court

The military commissions seem to guarantee the right to
review by a regularly constituted court-the United States Court
of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit and, if necessary,
Under R.M.C. 1201, the Court of Military
the Supreme Court.'
Commission Review performs the initial review of decisions by
military commissions; the military court's decisions can
subsequently be appealed in regular U.S. courts." 7 Unfortunately,
R.M.C. 1201 provides that "[n]o relief may be granted unless an
error of law prejudiced a substantial trial right of the accused."'68
This limitation might be construed to restrict appeals to issues of
law and would not permit challenges to convictions for insufficient
evidence to support the conviction or review of sentences. That
provision must be compared with the requirement in Article 14(5)
of the Civil and Political Covenant, which states: "Everyone
convicted of a crime shall have the right to his conviction and
1 69
sentence being reviewed by a higher tribunal according to law."
The Human Rights Committee has interpreted the Article 14(5)
right to review by a higher tribunal to require complete review of
factual determinations made by the trial court.1'

165. See Baban v. Australia, U.N. Human Rights Committee, Communication
No. 1014/2001, U.N. Doc. CCPR/C/78/D/1014/2001 (2003). In this case, an Iraqi
national of Kurdish ethnicity was detained after arriving in Australia without
travel documentation. Id.
1.1, 2.2. Although Australia permitted judicial
review of his detention, the review was limited to whether Mr. Baban was in fact a
6.1-6.8. The Committee
non-citizen without valid entry documentation. Id.
7.2; see also Civil and
found Australia to be in violation of Article 9(1), (4). Id.
Political Covenant, supra note 11, at art. 9(1), (4).
166. MMC, supra note 6, pt. II,R. 1205.
167. Id. pt. II, R. 1201, R. 1205.
168. Id. pt. II, R. 1201(d)(1).
169. Civil and Political Covenant, supra note 11, at art. 14(5).
170. See Saidova v. Tajikistan, U.N. Human Rights Committee, Communication
No. 964/2001, U.N. Doc. CCPR/C/81/D/964/2001 (2004) (finding a violation of
Article 14(5) where the defendant had an opportunity to appeal to a military
commission but the review was not mandatory and the military commission could
only consider legal issues); see also Cabriada v. Spain, U.N. Human Rights
Committee, Communication No. 1101/2002, U.N. Doc. CCPR/C/82/D/1101/2002
(2004); Terr6n v. Spain, U.N. Human Rights Committee, Communication No.
1073/2002, U.N. Doc. CCPR/C/82/D/1073/2002 (2004); Semey v. Spain, U.N. Human
Rights Committee, Communication No. 986/2001, U.N. Doc. CCPR/C/78/D/986/2001
(2003); Ferndndez v. Spain, U.N. Human Rights Committee, Communication No.
1007/2001, U.N. Doc. CCPR/C/78/D/1007/2001 (2003); Vdzquez v. Spain, U.N.
Doc.
701/1996, U.N.
Human Rights Committee, Communication No.
CCPR/C/69/D/701/1996 (2000); Perera v. Australia, U.N. Human Rights
Committee, Communication No. 536/1993, U.N. Doc. CCPR/C/53/D/536/1993
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The D.C. Circuit Court also reviews interlocutory appeals
"related to the protection of classified information, the closure of
proceedings from the public, or the exclusion of the accused from
certain proceedings."'71 The defendant may waive or withdraw
appellate review for any military commission "except one in which
the approved sentence includes death."'72
F. Evidence Obtained Through Coercive Means
The use of evidence procured through torture constitutes a
violation of Common Article 3,173 customary international law,'74
the Convention Against Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman or
Degrading Treatment or Punishment ("Convention Against
Torture"),' and the Civil and Political Covenant. 7 ' The use of
evidence procured through coercive methods raises similar
concerns because the definition of coercion may include
impermissible methods that rise to the level of cruel, inhuman,

(1995).
171. MMC, supra note 6, pt. II, R. 908(d).
172. Id. pt. II, R. 1110(f)(2).
173. Common Article 3, supra note 23.
174. See Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court, supra note 117, at
art. 69(7) (excluding admission of evidence that would be "antithetical to and would
seriously damage the integrity of the proceedings"); Regina v. Bartle, Ex Parte
Pinochet, 38 I.L.M. 581 (H.L. 1999) (finding that the Convention Against Torture
precluded any state immunity for torture); Tobias Thienel, The Admissibility of
Evidence Obtained by Torture Under InternationalLaw, 17 EUR. J. INT'L L. 349,
351 (2006) (arguing that the inadmissibility of evidence procured by torture is
.generally understood to be without any exceptions whatsoever" under
international law). But see Arar v. Ashcroft, 414 F. Supp. 2d 250, 281-83 (E.D.N.Y.
2006) (holding that a remedy for alleged detention incommunicado and torture was
foreclosed by national security and foreign policy concerns).
175. Convention Against Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman or Degrading
Treatment or Punishment, opened for signature Dec. 10, 1984, 1465 U.N.T.S. 85
[hereinafter Convention Against Torture]. Article 15 of the Convention Against
Torture states: "Each State Party shall ensure that any statement which is
established to have been made as a result of torture shall not be invoked as
evidence in any proceedings, except against a person accused of torture as evidence
that the statement was made." Id. at art. 15. An additional burden of inquiry is
placed on State Parties under Article 12 to investigate information that torture
may have been used "in any territory under its jurisdiction," a duty which the
United States may not be upholding under these trials, as no provision in the
R.M.C. requires such an investigation. Id. at art. 12.
176. The Human Rights Committee stated in Higginson v. Belarus that,
"[ilrrespective of the nature of the crime that is to be punished or the permissibility
of corporal punishment under domestic law, it is the consistent opinion of the
Committee that corporal punishment constitutes cruel, inhuman and degrading
treatment or punishment contrary to article 7 of the Covenant." U.N. Human
792/1998,
4.6, U.N.
Doc.
Rights Committee,
Communication No.
CCPR/C/74/D/792/1998 (2002).
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With the recent debate over the
and degrading treatment.'
7
the language of the new
United States' definition of these terms,"'
rules presents another concern about the legality of the
commissions and their procedures.
1.

The Manual for Military Commissions Allows
Coerced Evidence

The Preamble to the Manual 7 9 rightly excludes statements
obtained by torture but specifically allows for "statements 'in
which the degree of coercion is disputed'.., if reliable, probative,
and the admission would best serve the interests of justice" 8 ' and
"admission of an accused's allegedly coerced statements if they
comport with § 948r."8 '
R.M.C.E. 304 concerns "confessions, admissions, and other
statements" and sets forth the overall standard for determining
whether a statement is the product of coercion: the "totality of the
circumstances under which the contested statement was produced
177. See Rosemary Pattenden, Admissibility in Criminal Proceedings of Third
Party and Real Evidence Obtained by Methods Prohibitedby UNCAT, 10 INT'L J. OF
EVID. & PROOF 6 (2006) (examining international standards of what constitutes
torture and noting that "it is a grave crime to extract information from prisoners or
civilians by torture or ill-treatment"); see also Rome Statute of the International
Criminal Court, supra note 117, at art. 8, § 2(a)(ii) (declaring that grave breaches of
the Geneva Convention include torture or inhuman treatment); Fourth Geneva
Convention, supra note 19, at arts 3, 31, 147; POW Convention, supra note 18, at
arts. 3, 17, 130. Human Rights Committee jurisprudence further elucidates the
parameters of what constitutes cruel, inhuman, and degrading treatment. In
Conteris v. Uruguay, the Human Rights Committee found that a confession
obtained after ill-treatment violated the accused's right not to be compelled to
confess guilt under Article 14(3)(g) of the Civil and Political Covenant. U.N.
10, U.N. Doc. A/40/40
Human Rights Committee, Communication No. 139/1983,
(1985). Arrested by security police for crimes associated with subverting the
1.4.
constitution, the victim spent three months in incommunicado detention. Id.
Subjected to various forms of torture, he eventually signed a confession. Id. The
Human Rights Committee held that he did not voluntarily sign the confession. Id.
[ 9.2; see also El-Megreisi v. Libyan Arab Jamahiriya, U.N. Human Rights
5.4, U.N. Doc. CCPR/C/50/D/440/1990
Committee, Communication No. 440/1990,
(1994) ("[The detainee,] by being subjected to prolonged incommunicado detention
in an unknown location, is the victim of torture and cruel and inhuman treatment,
in violation of Articles 7 and 10. .. ").
178. See, e.g., Jennifer Daskal, Op-Ed, Detainee Legislation Clearly Outlaws
"Alternative"InterrogationTechniques, NARRAGANSETr TIMES (R.I.), Nov. 8, 2006,
For further
available at http://hrw.org/english/docs/2006/11/08/usdom14702.htm.
discussion of problems with the military commissions' evidentiary rules, see Eun
Young Choi, Veritas, Not Vengeance: An Examination of the Evidentiary Rules for
Military Commissions in the War Against Terrorism, 43 HARV. C.R.-C.L. L. REV.
139 (2007).
179. MMC, supra note 6, pt. I, § (1)(g).
180. Id. (citing 10 U.S.C. § 948r(b)-(c) (2006)).
181. Id. pt. I, § (1)(h)(3) (citing 10 U.S.C. § 949a(b)(2)(B) (2006)).
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or obtained."1 8 R.M.C.E. 304(c) further provides a dual standard
for "statements allegedly produced by coercion," creating one test
for statements procured by interrogation methods that amount to
cruel, inhuman, or degrading treatment before the enactment of
the Detainee Treatment Act on December 30, 2005,183 and a
stricter test for statements obtained thereafter. 184
The current U.S. administration has authorized "coercive"
interrogation conduct8 5 "so brutal that it essentially amounts to
torture."'
The international prohibition applies to evidence
procured through these means. In A v. Secretary of State for the
Home Department,8 ' the United Kingdom House of Lords
observed:
It may well be that the conduct complained of in a
memorandum dated October 11, 2002 addressed to the
Commander Joint Task Force 170 at Guantanamo Bay, Cuba,
(see The Torture Papers: The Road to Abu Ghraib, ed. K.
Greenberg and J. Dratel, (2005), p. 227-228), would now be
held to fall within the definition [of torture] in Art. 1 of the
Torture Convention.188
Even if evidence was not procured by torture, but rather by
cruel, inhuman, or degrading treatment, the rationale for the
exclusion of evidence adduced by torture is the same as the rule
that makes evidence procured by other forms of ill-treatment
inadmissible. 88
Information obtained by either torture or ill182. See id. pt. III, R. 304(a) note.
183. See Detainee Treatment Act, Pub. L. No. 109-163, 119 Stat. 3474 (2006)
(codified as amended throughout 10 U.S.C., 28 U.S.C., 42 U.S.C.).
184. MMC, supra note 6, pt. III, R. 304(c)(1)-(2).
185. Memorandum from William J. Haynes II, Gen. Counsel, Dep't of Def., to
Donald
Rumsfeld,
Sec'y
of Def.
(Nov.
27, 2002),
available at
http://www.slate.com/features/whatistorture/LegalMemos.html (discussing counterresistance techniques).
186. See Press Release, Sen. John McCain, Statement of Senator John McCain
on Detainee Amendments on (1) The Army Field Manual and (2) Cruel, Inhumane,
Degrading Treatment (Nov. 4, 2005), available at http://mccain.senate.gov (follow
"Press Office" hyperlink; then follow "Press Releases" hyperlink; then enter the
words "November 2005" in "Recent Press Releases" search field) (arguing for the
passage of the Detainee Treatment Act because without it the United States "is the
only country in the world that asserts a legal right to engage in cruel and
inhumane treatment"). See generally Daskal, supra note 178.
187. A v. Sec'y of State for the Home Dep't, [2005] UKHL 71, [2005] 3 W.L.R.
1249, rev'g, [2004] EWCA 1123, [2005] 1 W.L.R. 414.
188. Id. at 1285.
189. Sahadeo v. Republic of Guyana, U.N. Human Rights Committee,
Communication No. 728/1996,
9.3, U.N. Doc. CCPR/C/73/D/728/1996 (1996)
(dictum) ("The Committee recalls the duty of the State party to ensure the
protection against torture and cruel, inhuman or degrading treatment as provided
for in Article 7 of the Covenant. The Committee considers that it is important for
the prevention of violations under Article 7 that the law must exclude the
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treatment is unreliable since a witness will say whatever he or she
believes may stop the infliction of pain-rather than telling the
truth. 9 ' There is an absolute prohibition of torture as well as
cruel, inhuman, or degrading treatment or punishment. To admit
information adduced by either torture or other ill-treatment
outrages the values of civilization and could be perceived as an
unacceptable incentive to engage in such severe abuse. Further,
by admitting confessions that are uncorroborated and possibly
adduced without warning, the Manual provides insufficient
protection from self-incrimination. 19"' Admitting such information
also undermines the right to a fair and impartial trial.
2.

International Prohibitions on Evidence Obtained by
Ill-Treatment

While the Convention Against Torture 9 ' specifically prohibits
the use of evidence adduced by torture, other international
instruments and authoritative interpretations also forbid the use
of evidence obtained by either torture or other ill-treatment. For
example, Principle 16 of the Guidelines on the Role of Prosecutors
admissibility in judicial proceedings of statements or confessions obtained through
torture or other prohibited treatment.").
190. See Center for Victims of Torture, Eight Lessons of Torture,
http://www.cvt.orglmain.php/Advocacy/TheCampaigntoStopTorture/WhatCVTknow
saboutTorture (last visited Feb. 13, 2008) (explaining why torture does not yield
reliable information).
191. See United States v. Bin Laden, 132 F. Supp. 2d 168, 181-88 (S.D.N.Y.
2001) (holding that a non-resident alien interrogated abroad is nonetheless entitled
to Fifth Amendment protection against self-incrimination); see also Dickerson v.
United States, 530 U.S. 428, 444 (2000) ("Miranda[ v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436
(1966),] announced a constitutional rule that Congress may not supercede
legislatively."); Kim Lane Schepple, Law in a Time of Emergency: States of
Exception and the Temptations of 9/11, 6 PA. J. CONST.L. 1001, 1025 n.84 (2004)
(noting that the application of a constitutional right to counsel to noncitizens
interrogated abroad was an issue of first impression in Bin Laden); Carrie
Truehart, United States v. Bin Laden and the Foreign Intelligence Exception to the
Warrant Requirement for Searches of "United States Person"Abroad, 82 B.U. L.
REV. 555, 557-58 (2002) (noting that in the Bin Laden case the court suppressed
statements by a non-citizen defendant because he was given an insufficient
Miranda warning). But see Linda M. Keller, Alternatives to Miranda: Preventing
Coerced Confessions via the Convention Against Torture, 10 CHAP. L. REV. 745,
747-48 (2007) (citing several reasons why the Miranda warnings may not apply to
War on Terror detainees); Benjamin J. Priester, Return of the Great Writ: Judicial
Review, Due Process, and the Detention of Alleged Terroristsas Enemy Combatants,
37 RUTGERS L.J. 39, 93-94 (2005) (noting that Miranda warnings may give way to
military authority in an enemy combatant detention); Frank J. Williams, Still a
FrighteningUnknown: Achieving a Constitutional Balance Between Civil Liberties
and National Security During the War on Terror, 12 ROGER WILLIAMS U. L. REV.
675 (2007) (finding it unrealistic to expect Miranda warnings to apply to "alien
enemy combatants arrested in a desert in the Middle East").
192. Convention Against Torture, supra note 175.
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states:
When prosecutors come into possession of evidence against
suspects that they know or believe on reasonable grounds was
obtained through recourse to unlawful methods, which
constitute a grave violation of the suspect's human rights,
especially involving torture or cruel, inhuman or degrading
treatment or punishment, or other abuses of human rights,
they shall refuse to use such evidence against anyone other
than those who used such methods, or inform the Court
accordingly, and shall take all necessary steps to ensure that
those responsible for using such methods are brought to

justice. 193
Similarly, Article 12 of the U.N. Declaration on the Protection of
All Persons from Being Subjected to Torture and Other Cruel,
Inhuman or Degrading Treatment or Punishment provides: "Any
statement which is established to have been made as a result of
torture or other cruel, inhuman or degrading treatment or
punishment may not be invoked as evidence against the194person
concerned or against any other person in any proceedings."'
In 1982, the Human Rights Committee authoritatively
interpreted the broad prohibition of Article 7 of the Civil and
Political Covenant against torture and ill-treatment 19" as
incorporating the exclusionary rule.
The Committee notes that it is not sufficient for the
implementation of this article to prohibit such treatment or
punishment or to make it a crime .... Among the safeguards
which may make control effective are provisions against
detention incommunicado, granting, without prejudice to the
investigation, persons such as doctors, lawyers and family
members access to the detainees; provisions requiring that
detainees should be held in places that are publicly recognized
and that their names and places of detention should be
entered in a central register available to persons concerned,
such as relatives; provisions making confessions or other
evidence obtained through torture or other treatment contrary
to article 7 inadmissible in court; and measures of training and
instruction of law enforcement officials not to apply such

treatment. 196
193. U.N. Secretariat, Eighth United Nations Congress on the Prevention of
Crime and the Treatment of Offenders, 16, U.N. Doc. A/CONF.144/28/Rev.1 (Aug.
27, 1990-Sept. 7, 1990).
194. G.A. Res. 3452 (XXX), Annex, art. 13, U.N. Doc. A/RES/3452(XXX) (Dec. 9,
1975).
195. "No one shall be subjected to torture or to cruel, inhuman or degrading
treatment or punishment." Civil and Political Covenant, supra note 11, at art. 7.
196. U.N. Human Rights Comm., General Comment 7 (emphasis added),
reprinted in U.N. Secretariat, Compilation of General Comments and General
Recommendations Adopted by Human Rights Treaty Bodies,
1, U.N. Doc.
HRI \GEN \1\Rev. 1 (1994).
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The Human Rights Committee repeated this interpretation of
Article 7 of the Covenant when it replaced General Comment 7
with General Comment 20 in 1992. "It is important for the
discouragement of violations under [A]rticle 7 that the law must
prohibit the ... admissibility in judicial proceedings of statements
or confessions
obtained through torture or other prohibited
97
treatment."1
Furthermore, Article 14(3)(g) of the Civil and Political
Covenant provides that an accused may not be compelled to testify
against himself/herself or to confess guilt. 9 ' The Human Rights
Committee stated in General Comment 32 that, under this
provision, "it is unacceptable to treat an accused person in a
manner contrary to Article 7 of the Covenant in order to extract a
confession." 199 State laws should therefore require that evidence
provided through such methods or any other form of compulsion be
entirely inadmissible. °
In its jurisprudence, the Committee found coterminous
violations of Articles 7 and 14(3)(g) in the case of a murder suspect
forced under threats of death to sign a confession.20 1 The
Committee recalled:
[T]he wording of [Alrticle 14, paragraph 3(g), namely that no

197. U.N. Human Rights Comm., General Comment 20, reprinted in U.N.
Secretariat, Compilation of General Comments and General Recommendations
Adopted by Human Rights Treaty Bodies,
12, U.N. Doc. HRI\GEN\1\Rev.1
(1994).
198. Civil and Political Covenant, supra note 11, at art. 14.
199. Gen. Comm. 32, supra note 38, 41. Article 7 provides that "[n]o one shall
be subjected to torture or to cruel, inhuman or degrading treatment or
punishment." Id.; see also U.N. Human Rights Comm., Consideration of Reports
Submitted by States Parties Under Article 40 of the Covenant: Concluding
Observations of the Human Rights Committee: Georgia, 9T 13, U.N. Doc.
CCPR/C/79/Add.75 (May 5, 1997) (deploring the fact that capital sentences
appeared to be imposed in Georgia cases where confessions were obtained under
torture or duress).
200. The Human Rights Committee applied these principles in Khalilov v.
Tajikistan, where the government accused Khalilov of being a member of an "anticonstitutional" gang.
U.N. Human Rights Committee, Communication No.
973/2001, 2.1, U.N. Doc. CCPR/C/83/D/973/2001 (2005). Khalilov claimed that he
had been forced to join the gang. Id. Prior to his trial, the government compelled
Khalilov-using beatings and threats to his family-to confess on national
television to murder. Id. 91 2.5-2.6. He was later convicted of murder and a
variety of other crimes and sentenced to death. Id. 912.8. The Committee found a
number of fair trial violations, including that Tajikistan had violated the
prohibition on forced confessions. Id. 918.
201. Berry v. Jamaica, U.N. Human Rights Committee, Communication No.
330/1988, T 11.7, U.N. Doc. CCPR/C/50/D/330/1988 (1994). The European Court of
Human Rights has similarly found that admission of evidence obtained by
compulsion breached the defendant's right to a fair trial. Saunders v. United
Kingdom, (No. 24), 1996-IV Eur. Ct. H.R. 2044, 2066.
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one shall 'be compelled to testify against himself or to confess
guilt,' must be understood in terms of the absence of any direct
or indirect physical or psychological pressure from the
investigating authorities on 20the
accused, with a view to
2
obtaining a confession of guilt.
Similarly, the International Criminal Tribunal for Yugoslavia
adopted Rule 95 of its Rules of Procedure and Evidence, which
reads: "No evidence shall be admissible if obtained by methods
which cast substantial doubt on its reliability or if its admission is
antithetical to, and would seriously damage, the integrity of the
proceedings .
The Parliamentary Assembly of the Council of Europe called
on the U.S. government
to respect its obligations under international law and the
Constitution of the United States to exclude any statement
established to have been made as a result of torture or other
cruel, inhuman or degrading treatment or punishment from
any proceedings, except against a person accused of such illtreatment as evidence that the statement was made.0 4
In that resolution, the Parliamentary Assembly called on its
Member States of the Council of Europe to do the same.0 5 If the
United States intends to portray its military commissions as being
equal to or better than international tribunals in its protection of
fair trial rights,0 6 it would do well to ensure that evidence
gathered through the use of cruel, inhuman, and degrading
treatment is likewise strictly excluded.
3.

The Admissibility of Coerced Evidence Violates
Internationally Recognized Fair Trial Protections

In addition to the national security privilege discussed above,
other procedures prevent both defendants and the public from

202. Johnson v. Jamaica, U.N. Human Rights Committee, Communication No.
588/1994, T 8.7, U.N. Doc. No. A/51/40 (1994) (quoting the Civil and Political
Covenant).
203. Int'l Criminal Tribunal for the Former Yugo., Rules of Procedure and
Evidence, R. 95, U.N. Doc. IT/32/Rev.40 (2007). The International Criminal
Tribunal for Rwanda employs an identical exclusionary rule. Int'l Criminal
Tribunal for Rwanda, Rules of Procedure and Evidence, R. 95, U.N. Doc.
ITR/3/Rev.1 (1995). For a similar exclusionary rule, see Rome Statute of the
International Criminal Court, supra note 117, at art. 69(7).
204. PARL. Ass., RES. 1433, 9T8(vi) (Apr. 26, 2005).
205. Id. T110(iv).
206. See Davis, supra note 115, at 34 (challenging "anyone to review the MCA
and MCC, compare them to the rules for.., the International Criminal Tribunal
for the Former Yugoslavia, the International Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda, . ..
and then explain why military commissions provide an inferior standard of justice
by comparison").
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knowing what methods were used to extract the information for
the government's case. This situation makes the determination of
admissibility more difficult and places a nearly impossible burden
of proof on the defense. The government cannot put the burden on
the defendant to prove a confession was involuntary; it would
violate the prohibition against forced confessions under Article
14(3)(g) as well as the presumption of innocence under Article
14(2).207

Judge Neuberger of the United Kingdom Court of Appeals
explained the difficulty faced by the accused when the government
presents evidence about a statement extracted from an individual
other than the accused.
[Tihe detainee will normally know of all the circumstances in
which the confession was extracted, and will be able to give
evidence in court to explain those circumstances, and possibly
to give other evidence to rebut the reliability of the confession.
However, it will be a very rare case where the detainee would
know very much about the circumstances in which the
statement was extracted from a third party, or where the
detainee would be able to arrange for evidence to be given
about those circumstances. Almost by definition, he will not
be able to call or cross-examine the third party with a view to
208
the third party explaining or rebutting the statement.

Similarly, the procedures of the military commissions violate the
Civil and Political Covenant and Common Article 3.
On the whole, the judicial guarantees prescribed by the
Manual have the potential to go very much awry. There is a
significant risk that these proceedings will be used in a way that
flouts fundamental precepts of international law. The United
States recently denied habeas corpus protections to detainees, and

207. See Civil and Political Covenant, supra note 11, at art. 14. For example, in
Singarasav. Sri Lanka, a Tamil man claimed he was forced to confess to causing
the death of army officers and engaging in other terrorist activities. See U.N.
Human Rights Committee, Communication No. 1033/2001, U.N. Doc.
CCPRC/811D/1033/2001 (2004). At trial, the government put the burden of proving

that the confession was involuntary on Mr. Singarasa. Id. 210. The confession
was admitted and Singarasa was convicted. Id. 1$2.10-12. Among other issues,
the Human Rights Committee considered whether the burden of proof could be
placed on Singarasa under the Civil and Political Covenant. Id. 1[ 7.4. The
Committee reasoned that it was implicit in Civil and Political Covenant Article
14(3)(g), which prohibits forced confessions, that the prosecution must prove the
confession was made without duress. Id.; see also Deolall v. Guyana, U.N. Human
Rights Committee, Communication No. 912/2000, U.N. Doc. CCPR/C/82/D/912/2000
(2004).
208. A v. Sec'y of State for the Home Dep't, [2004] EWCA (Civ.) 1123 [464],

[20051 1 WLR 414, 548. The U.K. House of Lords reversed the Court of Appeals and
sustained the views expressed by Judge Neuberger. A v. Sec'y of State for the
Home Dep't, [2005] UKHL 71, [2005] 1 WLR 1249, 1285.
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courts have not extended constitutional protections to them. 2 9 As
written, the Manual might allow the following trial strategy for
the prosecution:
first, three days of uncontested prosecution
witnesses describing a well-documented case about the crimes of
the Al Qaeda organization;210 second, presentation of one witness
tying the accused to Al Qaeda through a heavily redacted
summary of information from unrevealed sources. That single
witness might well take advantage of the national security
privilege to deny the accused and his counsel any indication as to
the identity of the source of the testimony, the context in which
the information was collected, the treatment meted out to the
source of the information, and the reliability of assurances that
the information was not procured by the use of torture. Such a
situation would deny the accused the following rights: the right to
cross-examine, the right to confrontation, the right to be judged on
the basis of the facts on the record, and the right to equality of
arms. This situation would constitute an unfair trial.
IV. Interpreting the Manual for Military Commissions
Using International Law Regarding the Right to a Fair
Trial
To summarize the conclusions of this Article thus far: as set
forth in the Manual for Military Commissions, the military
commissions would not qualify as regularly constituted courts and
could fail to afford the requisite judicial guarantees, unless the
Manual is interpreted in a manner consistent with international
law.21' For example, prosecutors could claim national security as a
basis for denying confrontation and cross-examination and may
use evidence procured through methods that amount to torture or
forbidden ill-treatment unless the military commissions interpret
the Manual to require the protections guaranteed by Common
Article 3 and the Civil and Political Covenant.212
One approach to dealing with the potential inadequacies of
the fair trial guarantees in the Manual is to use international fair
trial norms in evaluating and interpreting the broad federal
statutory and regulatory provisions.
International law and
jurisprudence could assist the military commissions and reviewing
courts in interpreting the Manual to protect fair trial rights.
209. See Editorial, Too Many Secrets, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 20, 2007, at A12;
Labaton, supra note 104, at Al.
210. See generally MMC, supra note 6, pt. II.
211. See supra Part II.
212. See infra Part IV.B.

390
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Treaties and their authoritative interpretations provide guidance
on how to guarantee the protections necessary for fair trials.213
U.S. courts have often relied on international standards and
jurisprudence in resolving delicate legal issues and the military
the
commissions should be no different, especially 2considering
1
1
international nature of the problems they confront.
A. Treaty Obligations
The United States ratified the four Geneva Conventions of
1949 and the Civil and Political Covenant-all of which protect
The Constitution mandates
fair trial rights for detainees.2 15
respect for these treaties, which impose obligations on the United
Article VI of the U.S. Constitution
States and its courts.
establishes:
This Constitution, and the Laws of the United States which
shall be made in Pursuance thereof; and all Treaties made, or
which shall be made, under the Authority of the United
States, shall be the supreme Law of the Land; and the Judges
in every State shall be bound thereby, any Thing in the
Constitution or Laws of any State to the Contrary
notwithstanding.
A treaty ratified by the United States is part of the supreme law of
the land, equal in dignity to federal statutes.217 Despite the
Constitution's statement that treaties shall be the supreme law of
the land, U.S. courts have developed a doctrine making only selfexecuting treaties judicially enforceable.218

213. See infra Part IV.B.
214. See infra Part IV.B.
215. See supra Part I.B.

216. U.S. CONST. art. VI.
217. Conflicts between treaty clauses and existing law are resolved according to
three rules. First, a treaty will not have domestic effect if it infringes certain
clauses of the U.S. Constitution. Reid v. Covert, 354 U.S. 1, 16-17 (1957). Second,
if a treaty and a federal statute conflict, the more recent prevails. Chinese
Exclusion Case, 130 U.S. 581, 599-600 (1889). Third, if a treaty and state law
conflict, the treaty controls. Zschernig v. Miller, 389 U.S. 429, 440-41 (1968); Clark
v Allen, 331 U.S. 503, 508 (1947); Asakura v. City of Seattle, 265 U.S. 332, 341
(1924); see also Missouri v. Holland, 252 U.S. 416, 433-35 (1920) (stating that the
validity of the treaty was not undermined by possible infringement on states' rights
Before applying a treaty, courts must: (1)
under the Tenth Amendment).
determine whether certain treaty provisions are self-executing; (2) interpret the
language of the treaty; and (3) consider the effect of reservations made when the
treaty was adopted. See Frolova v. U.S.S.R., 761 F.2d 370, 373-76 (7th Cir. 1985).
218. The Supreme Court introduced the requirement of self-execution in Foster
v. Neilson, 27 U.S. (2 Pet.) 253, 314 (1829). It declared that a treaty clause is selfexecuting and hence "equivalent to an act of the legislature, whenever it operates
by itself without the aid of any legislative provision." Id. Foster held the treaty to
be non-self-executing, on the assumption that the parties anticipated a need for
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The District Court for the District of Columbia discussed
congressional action regarding the Geneva Conventions in
Hamdan v. Rumsfeld.219 The Senate articulated its advice and
consent regarding the Geneva Conventions in 1955 without
making an explicit statement about self-execution."' In looking to
the Senate's intent in consenting to the ratification of the Geneva
Conventions, the court found that the 1955 Senate carefully
considered what legislation would be required to give effect to the
provisions of the conventions and determined that only four
provisions-none relevant to a military commission-required
implementing legislation." 1 The court also noted that Congress
enacted the War Crimes Act in response to a concurring opinion
from the D.C. Circuit Court in 1984, which suggested that persons
could not be prosecuted for grave violations of the Geneva
The court concluded that the legislative branch
Conventions."
had confirmed that the Geneva Conventions were intended to be
implementing legislation to make the obligations sufficiently definite to be
judicially enforceable. Id. Four years later, however, the Court found the same
bilateral treaty to be self-executing based upon a review of the Spanish text and the
history of negotiations. See United States v. Percheman, 32 U.S. (7 Pet.) 51, 88
(1833). Subsequent decisions have focused on the intent of the parties. See, e.g.,
Cook v. United States, 288 U.S. 102, 119-20 (1933) (finding no evidence of
congressional intent to abrogate the treaty). In Frolova v. U.S.S.R., the court
compiled a list of factors to be consulted in determining whether a treaty provision
is self-executing, including:
(1) the language and purposes of the agreement as a whole;
(2) the circumstance surrounding its execution;
(3) the nature of the obligations imposed by the agreement;
(4) the availability and feasibility of alternative enforcement mechanisms;
(5) the implications of permitting a private right of action; and
(6) the capability of the judiciary to resolve the dispute.
761 F.2d at 373 (citations omitted). For a similar list, see People of Saipan v. U.S.
Department of Interior, 502 F.2d 90, 97 (9th Cir. 1974). In Jogi v. Voges, the
Seventh Circuit relied on the first three of these factors to hold that Article 36 of
the Vienna Convention is self-executing and confers an individual right to consular
notification. 425 F.3d 367, 377, 384 (7th Cir. 2005). But see Medellin v. Texas, No.
06-984, 2008 WL 762533 (Mar. 25, 2008) (holding that an International Court of
Justice's decision finding a violation of U.S. obligations under the Vienna
Convention on Consular Relations is not automatically binding domestic law due to
lack of implementing legislation and that the President cannot "unilaterally
[convert a] non-self-executing treaty into a self-executing one"); United States v.
Emuegbunam, 268 F.3d 377, 391 (6th Cir. 2001) ("The Vienna Convention does
not create rights individually enforceable in the federal courts."); United States v.
Jiminez-Nava, 243 F.3d 192, 198 (5th Cir. 2001) (holding that the Vienna
Convention does not create judicially enforceable rights).
219. See Hamdan v. Rumsfeld, 344 F. Supp. 2d 152, 164-65 (D.D.C. 2004), rev'd,
415 F.3d 33 (D.C. Cir. 2005), rev'd, 126 S.Ct. 2749 (2006).
220. Hamdan, 344 F. Supp. 2d at 164.
221. See id.
222. Id. at 164-65.
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the law of the land, enforceable by the courts.222 On appeal, the
Supreme Court noted that, in as much as the Geneva Conventions
are a part of the law of war, they do confer rights enforceable in
U.S. courts. 24
In contrast, with regard to the military
commissions, the MCA includes a clause limiting the force of the
225
Geneva Conventions.
In ratifying the Civil and Political Covenant, the Senate gave
its advice and consent on the understanding "[tihat the United
States declares that the provisions of Articles 1 through 27 of the
Covenant are not self-executing."2 6 In Sosa v. Alvarez-Machain,2 7
the Supreme Court addressed this declaration when it reviewed a
suit brought by a Mexican national alleging violation of his rights
under the Alien Tort Claims Act after he was abducted and
transferred to the United States to stand trial. 8 In dicta, the
Court stated:
[A]lthough the [Civil and Political] Covenant does bind the
United States as a matter of international law, the United
States ratified the Covenant on the express understanding
that it was not self-executing and so did not itself create
obligations enforceable in the federal courts.... Accordingly,
Alvarez cannot say that the [Universal] Declaration [of
Human Rights] and Covenant themselves establish the
relevant and applicable rule of international law. 229
While not essential to the Court's holding, this passage suggests
that enforcement of a treaty in federal courts may be more difficult
given an explicit Senate statement that a treaty is not selfexecuting.
It follows that directly enforcing the Geneva Conventions and
the Civil and Political Covenant in U.S. courts may be challenging
because of the uncertain self-executing nature of treaties. The
language of the MCA further diminishes the binding force of the
Geneva Conventions as it states that "[n]o alien unlawful enemy
combatant subject to trial by military commission ...may invoke
the Geneva Conventions as a source of rights."22
These
223. Id. at 165.
224. Hamdan v. Rumsfeld, 126 S. Ct. 2749, 2845 (2006) (Thomas, J., dissenting)
("The Court concludes that petitioner may seek judicial enforcement of the
provisions of the Geneva Conventions because 'they are... part of the law of war.'"
(quoting the majority opinion)).
225. Military Commissions Act (MCA) of 2006, Pub. L. No. 109-366, sec. 5, 120
Stat. 2601, 2631-32 (2007) (to be codified at 10 U.S.C. § 948b(g)).
226. 138 CONG. REC. S4781, 4784 (1992).
227. 542 U.S. 692 (2004).
228. Id. at 692.
229. Id. at 735.
230. MCA, § 948b(g).
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impediments do not, however, render the treaties useless since
they do not exclude using the Geneva Conventions or the
Covenant as a means
of interpreting the Manual, rather than a
"source of rights. " " Hence, a federal statute can be a "source of
rights," and may make use of the Geneva Conventions and other
international norms only as interpretive tools rather than as
independent sources of rights. Article 75 of Additional Protocol I,
the Civil and Political Covenant, and the interpretations of the
Human Rights Committee could be relied upon as a way of
interpreting federal statutes and regulations, such as the War
Crimes Act and the Manual.
The MCA states that "[a] military commission established
under this chapter is a regularly constituted court, affording all
the necessary 'judicial guarantees which are recognized as
indispensable by civilized peoples' for purposes of [C]ommon
Article 3 of the Geneva Conventions."232 Merely stating that it is
compliant does not make it so. It does, however, support the
likelihood that Congress intended the military commissions to
provide the fair trial guarantees required in the Geneva
Conventions by interpreting the Manual in light of Common
Article 3.
B. InterpretiveApproach
A treaty's relevance to interpretation of federal statutes, such
as the MCA, is reflected in the long-standing rule of statutory
construction known as the Charming Betsy233 rule of
interpretation. Chief Justice Marshall first enunciated this rule,
stating that "an act of Congress ought never to be construed to
violate the law of nations if any other possible construction
,,131
remains ....
The Manual reiterates the principle that the commissions
should accord with international law.235 The preamble states:
"Just as importantly, [the Manual] provides procedural and
evidentiary rules that not only comport with the [MCA] and
ensure protection of classified information, but extend to the
accused all the 'necessary judicial guarantees' as required by
231. See id.
232. § 948b(f). For more information on enforcing treaties in courts, see David
Sloss, When Do Treaties Create Individually Enforceable Rights? The Supreme
Court Ducks the Issue in Hamdan and Sanchez-Llamas, 45 COLUM. J. TRANSNAT'L
L. 20 (2006).
233. See Murray v. Schooner Charming Betsy, 6 U.S. (2 Cranch) 64 (1804).
234. Id. at 118.
235. See MMC, supra note 6, pt. I.
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Common Article 3. " '26This preamble indicates the authors' intent
that the Manual should be interpreted in a manner that ensures
protection of the fair trial guarantees required by Common Article
3.
The Defense Secretary's statements also track the language
of Common Article 3 in several places in the Manual, including the
Executive Summary, which states that "[this Manual] is intended
to ensure that alien unlawful enemy combatants who are
suspected of war crimes and certain other offenses are prosecuted
before regularly constituted courts affording all the judicial
guarantees which are recognized as indispensable by civilized
people."" 7 In understanding the meaning of "regularly constituted
court[s] affording all the judicial guarantees which are recognized
as indispensable,"23 the military commissions and courts should
take into account the sources set forth in this Article, including
Article 75 of Additional Protocol I, the Civil and Political
Covenant, and the interpretations of the Human Rights
Committee.
Interpreting the Manual in light of the human rights treaties
and the related international law so as to ensure fair trial
protections reflects the Supreme Court's approach in a number of
landmark cases. In Lawrence v. Texas, 39 the Court relied on the
jurisprudence of the European Court of Human Rights to assist in
determining "the values we share with a wider civilization."2" As
support for her concurrence in Grutter v. Bollinger,41 Justice
Ginsburg cited the International Convention on the Elimination of
All Forms of Racial Discrimination. 42
In examining the
protections guaranteed by the Eighth Amendment, " the Supreme
Court looked to treaties and foreign law to assist in its
determination of what constitutes cruel and unusual punishment
in both Roper v. Simmons 2" and Thompson v. Oklahoma.4 ' In

236. Id.
237. Id. (Executive Summary).
238. Common Article 3, supra note 19.
239. 539 U.S. 558 (2003).
240. See id. at 576.
241. 539 U.S. 306, 344 (2003) (Ginsburg, J., concurring).
242. See id.
243. U.S. CONST. amend. VIII.
244. 543 U.S. 551, 578 (2005) ("It does not lessen our fidelity to the Constitution
or our pride in its origins to acknowledge that the express affirmation of certain
fundamental rights by other nations and peoples simply underscores the centrality
of those same rights within our own heritage of freedom.").
245. 487 U.S. 815, 830-31 (1988).
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Hamdan v. Rumsfeld, 46 the Court relied upon the Geneva
Conventions and the international law of war to analyze the
247
authority of the President to convene the military commissions.
The Court noted that the military commission could only try
crimes acknowledged as an offense against the law of war2 48 and
that "international sources confirm that the crime charged here is
The Court
not a recognized violation of the law of war." 49
observed that the President's use of military commissions was
conditioned upon compliance with "the rules and precepts of the
law of nations."25 °
C. Policy Considerations
Not only has international law been used to interpret U.S.
law, but it can also be a very effective means of persuasion when
considering national policy. As discussed by Judge Linde of the
Oregon Supreme Court,
an advocate wishing to invoke international human rights
norms reasonably could argue that an applicable domestic law
already contains the protections that the claimant contends,
but that, if the court were not to accept this view, then the
court might well find itself running afoul of national policy as
expressed by the United States government through its
participation in international human rights activities and
declarations. 251
Linde further noted that such an approach is most successful
"where other countries and international agencies have had
greater experience than has the United States. Examples may
include .
the treatment of detained persons."252 Given the
international nature of the capture and detention of "unlawful
enemy combatants," it is especially important to interpret the
Manual in light of relevant treaties when considering its possible
impact on the officials responsible for commission proceedings, as
well as U.S. soldiers captured in future conflicts.253
Interpreting the Manual using Common Article 3 in a way
that provides for a fair trial of the detainees will also help the
246. 126 S. Ct. 2749 (2006).
247. See id. at 2774, 2781.
248. Id. at 2780.
249. Id. at 2784.
250. Id. at 2786 (quoting Ex parte Quirin, 317 U.S. 1, 28 (1942)); see also David
Sloss, Judicial Deference to Executive Branch Treaty Interpretations:A Historical
Perspective, 62 N.Y.U. ANN. SURV. AM. L. 497, 522 (2007).
251. Hans A. Linde, Comments, 18 INT'L LAw. 77, 81 (1984).
252. Id.
253. See infra Part IV.C.1-2.
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military commissions protect involved officials from prosecution by
foreign courts and promote policies that may serve to protect U.S.
soldiers in future conflicts.
1.

Protecting Involved Officials from Prosecution in
Foreign Countries

In deciding on the procedures to be followed in the military
commissions, responsible officials should be aware that "[t]he
passing of sentences and the carrying out of executions without
previous judgment pronounced by a regularly constituted court,
affording all the judicial guarantees which are recognized as
indispensable by civilized peoples," would constitute a war crime
and/or a crime against humanity."'
Post-World War II trials establish precedent for prosecuting
judges and other government officials responsible for conducting
The post-Nuremberg case of In re Alstotter 56
unfair trials.2"
involved the trial, sentencing, and imprisonment of a number of
presiding judges and German officials who participated in show
trials that resulted in executions." 7 The officials and judges had
supported or played a role in arbitrary judicial proceedings
initiated by Hitler that resulted in thousands of executions."' In
the Pacific, Japanese military authorities were also convicted for
their participation in show trials.25 9
Hence, failures to afford the judicial guarantees of Common
Article 3 in a non-international armed conflict could also be the
254. See Common Article 3, supra note 19.
255. See Robert Cryer, Accountability of Armed Opposition Groups in
International Law, by Liesbeth Zegveld, 53 INT'L & COMP. L.Q. 268, 270 (2004)
(book review) (arguing that Zegveld makes "unsupported statements" when she
implies that Common Article 3(d) "should not impose criminal responsibility on
individuals" and makes no mention of "numerous trials in the Pacific sphere after
the Second World War relating to the failure to grant minimal fair trial rights to
defendants").
256. 14 Ann. Dig. 278 (U.S. Milit. Tribunal 1947).
257. Id. at 278. These individuals were prosecuted for participation in genocide.
Id.
258. Id.
259. See, e.g., Trial of Lieutenant-General Shigeru Sawada, Case No. 25, 5 L.R.
TRIALS WAR CRIMS. 1, 7-8 (U.S. Milit. Comm'n Apr. 15, 1946) (highlighting a trial
that ended in the conviction of members of a military tribunal for various failures
to provide for fair trials). See generally Matthew Lippman, Prosecutions of Nazi
War Criminals Before Post-World War II Domestic Tribunals, 8 U. MIAMI INT'L &
CoMP. L. REV. 1, 80-88 (describing crimes and trial in the Sawada case). On a
more contemporary note, a judge in Iraq was recently executed for crime against
humanity for presiding over a series of sham trials. See Karen O'Brien, Executed
15,
2007,
http://news.bbc.co.uk/
NEWS,
Jan.
Judge's
Case, B.B.C.
2/hi/middleeast6262091.stm.
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basis for prosecution. Originally, the ad-hoc tribunals established
by the United Nations for the former Yugoslavia did not include
prosecutions under Common Article 3V60 They have since evolved
to include Common Article 3 in the subject matter jurisdiction of
the International Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda. 6' Additionally,
the Appeals Chamber of the International Criminal Court for the
Former Yugoslavia held that a criminal prosecution could be
founded upon conduct arising from the mixed international and
internal conflict taking place in the former Yugoslavia, 6 ' allowing
prosecution under Common Article 3.263
Should the Manual be found to violate the provisions of
prosecutors and other U.S. citizens
Common Article 3,2
responsible for the unfair military trials would be at risk of being
prosecuted.265 The U.S. War Crimes Act of 1996 defined a war

260. In his 1993 report, the Secretary-General indicated that the principle of
nullum crimen sine lege demanded that the subject matter of the International
Criminal Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia ("ICTY") be limited to violations of
international humanitarian law that were recognized under customary
international law as it existed at that time. The Secretary-General, Report of the
Secretary-General Pursuant to Paragraph 2 of Security Council Resolution 808
(1993), 35, delivered to the Security Council, U.N. Doc. S/25704 (May 3, 1993).
261. Statute of the International Tribunal for Rwanda, S.C. Res. 955, art. 4,
U.N. Doc. S/RES/955 (Nov. 8, 1994), reprinted in 33 I.L.M. 1598, 1600 (1994).
262. See Prosecutor v. Tadic, Case No. IT-94-1, Decision on the Defence Motion
for Interlocutory Appeal on Jurisdiction, %22 (Oct. 2, 1995), reprintedin 35 I.L.M.
32, 41 (1996).
89-93.
263. Id.
264. See Burke-White, supra note 46, at 22-23 ("Military tribunals, depending
on their structure and rules, may well violate core principles of international law,
such as the right---enshrined in numerous international conventions-to a fair trial
before an independent arbiter." (citation omitted)); Neal Kumar Katyal, Hamdan v.
Rumsfeld: The Legal Academy Goes to Practice, 120 HARv. L. REV. 65, 71 (2006)
("[Hamdan's] practical meaning is clear: military trials have to take place with
essential elements of military justice intact and must comply with the minimal
protections enshrined in Common Article 3 of the Geneva Conventions."); Geoffrey
S. Corn, Hamdan, Fundamental Fairness, and the Significance of Additional
Protocol II, ARMY LAW., Aug. 2006, at 1 ( "[Tihe message [in Hamdan] was clear:
the military commissions are not as 'full and fair' as the government has been
asserting since their inception. In a rejection of the course of action chosen by
President George W. Bush to provide criminal sanction to Al Qaeda operatives, the
Court held that the procedural construct of the military commission violated both
domestic constitutional limits on executive authority and the international law of
war reflected in Common Article 3 of the four Geneva Conventions of 1949."
(footnote omitted)); Posting of John Bellinger to Opinio Juris, The Meaning of
Common Article Three, http://www.opiniojuris.org/posts/1168814555.shtml (Jan.
16, 2007, 7:05 CST) (outlining the U.S. government's interpretation of Common
Article 3 via U.S. domestic law). But see Bradley, supra note 86, at 255 (arguing
that the military commissions originally set up at Guantinamo are not necessarily
in conflict with the POW Convention).
265. See Christopher C. Burris, Time for CongressionalAction: The Necessity of
Delineating the JurisdictionalResponsibilities of Federal District Courts, Courts-
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crime to include "a violation of [C]ommon Article 3 of the
international conventions signed at Geneva, 12 August 1949, or
any protocol to such convention to which the United States is a
party and which deals with non-international armed conflict ...
Accordingly, between 1996 and 2006, a trial in violation of
Common Article 3 could have resulted in a criminal prosecution in
U.S. courts for those officials responsible.267 The MCA, 2 however,
redefined "war crime" to exclude both lack of a fair trial and/or
outrages upon personal dignity under Common Article 3.269 Even
though the United States now limits its definition of "war crime,"
other countries continue to define "war crime" to include violations
of Common Article 3; these countries also allow prosecution of U.S.
nationals. 276
It may not be popular to suggest that the activities of
military commission officials and prosecutors may one day result
in criminal prosecutions somewhere in the world. In order to
provide for their safety, however, the possibility of such
prosecution should be considered. Former Secretary of State Colin
Powell warned that failure to follow the requirements of the
Geneva Conventions "may provoke some individual foreign
prosecutors to investigate and prosecute our officials and
troops."27' It would be an unfortunate result of fulfilling their duty
Martial,and Military Commissions to Try Violations of the Laws of War, 2005 FED.
CTS. L. REv. 4, 29 ("It has also become generally accepted that the protections of
Common Article 3 of the Geneva Conventions of 1949, which applies during noninternational armed conflicts, have become part of customary international law."
(citing Prosecutor v. Tadic, Case No. IT-94-1, Decision on the Defence Motion for
129-36 (Oct. 2, 1995), reprinted in 35
Interlocutory Appeal on Jurisdiction,
I.L.M. 32 (1996) (holding in paragraph 134 that "customary international law
imposes criminal liability for serious violations of [Clommon [Alrticle 3"))); Jinks,
supra note 70, at 409 ("The procedural rights recognized in the ICTY, ICTR, and
the ICC-tribunals empowered to try persons for serious violations of
humanitarian law, including war crimes-provide further evidence of a broad
consensus as to the essential (or 'indispensable') attributes of fair trials.").
266. War Crimes Act of 1996, Pub. L. No. 104-192, ch. 118, 110 Stat. 2104 (1996)
(current version at 18 U.S.C. § 2441(c)(3) (2006)). The U.S. Naval Handbook also
notes that "failure to provide a fair trial for the alleged commission of a war crime
is itself a war crime." DEP'T OF THE NAVY, THE COMMANDER'S HANDBOOK ON THE
LAW OF NAVAL OPERATIONS, NWP 1-14M, § 6.2.6.3 (2007), available at
http://www.nwc.navy.milcnws/ild/documents/1-14M-(Jul-2007)-(NWP).pdf.
267. See Pub. L. No. 104-192, ch. 118, 110 Stat. 2104, 2104.
268. Pub. L. No. 109-366, 120 Stat. 2600 (2006).
269. Id. § 6, 120 Stat. at 2632-35.
270. See Ian Fisher, Italy Indicts C.I.A. Operatives in '03 Abduction, N.Y. TIMES,
Feb. 17, 2007, at Al.
271. Memorandum from Colin L. Powell, Sec'y of State, to Counsel to the
President, Draft Decision Memorandum for the President on the Applicability of
the Geneva Convention to the Conflict in Afghanistan (Jan. 26, 2002), available at
http://www.slate.com/features/whatistorture/LegalMemos.html.
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if members of the military commission were told that, like Henry
Kissinger, they may one day need to engage in a prosecution risk
assessment before traveling to Italy, Germany, Spain,
Switzerland, Canada, or elsewhere.
2.

Protecting U.S. Soldiers in Future Conflicts

The impact of the military commissions on international law
and practice must also be considered. It is an unfortunate reality
that U.S. soldiers or citizens may be captured in future conflicts
with foreign nations or armed opposition groups. Upon capture,
their captors may cite current U.S. military commissions as
support for criminal prosecutions and the use of unfair trial
practices." ' The military commissions should strive to protect
every judicial guarantee protected by Common Article 3 and the
Civil and Political Covenant so that the military commissions
cannot be used to justify the unlawful prosecution of U.S. soldiers.
In a 1999 Foreword to a collection of essays on comparative
constitutional law, Chief Justice of the U.S. Supreme Court
William H. Rehnquist wrote:
[F]or nearly a century and a half, courts of the United States
exercising the power of judicial review [for constitutionality]
had no precedents to turn to except their own, because our
Court alone exercised this sort of authority. When many new
constitutional courts were created after the Second World
War, these courts naturally looked to decisions of the Supreme
Court of the United States, among other sources, for
developing their own law. But now that constitutional law is
solidly grounded in so many countries ... it [is] time the U.S.
courts began looking to the decisions of other constitutional
courts to aid in their own deliberative process. 273
This passage underscores the importance of considering
international law in judicial decision making and points out the
importance of U.S. jurisprudence on developing international law
and practice. For example, U.S. Supreme Court decisions played a
fundamental role in the International Criminal Tribunal for
Rwanda's decisions determining what constitutes a violation of a
detainee's rights.17'
The military commissions and reviewing

272. See Beard, supra note 59, at 64-69.
273. William H. Rehnquist, Foreword to DEFINING THE FIELD OF COMPARATIVE
CONSTITUTIONAL LAW v, viii (Vicki C. Jackson & Mark Tushnet eds., 2002). The
foreword is based on an edited transcript of introductory comments delivered at the
conference Comparative Constitutional Law: Defining the Field, held at
Georgetown University Law Center on September 17, 1999. Id. at ix n.1.
274. See Barayagwiza v. Prosecutor, Case No. ICTR-97-19, Decision,
96, 111
(Nov. 3, 1999).
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courts must bear in mind the jurisprudential effect of their
decision on case precedent, future U.S. military commissions, and
commissions or tribunals convened by other countries. The United
States must provide an example that promotes the fair and just
treatment of future U.S. POWs. This goal can be accomplished by
interpreting the Manual in a manner that accords with human
rights treaties and international jurisprudence regarding fair
trials.
Conclusion
Congress, in its pursuit of justice, created military
commissions that compromise the very values Congress seeks to
enforce. The Manual for Military Commissions, as literally read,
may lack sufficient guarantees for fair trials by compromising the
right to confront witnesses, the prohibition of evidence adduced by
torture or ill-treatment, and access to review by higher courts,
among other rights. Should the military commissions fail to
protect these fair trial rights, the commissions will be an albatross
around the neck of U.S. international relations and world image in
the years to come. To avoid these unfortunate consequences, the
military commissions and reviewing courts should construe the
MCA and the Manual to require the fair trial guarantees
prescribed by Common Article 3 of the Geneva Conventions, the
International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, and Article
75 of the Additional Protocol I to the Geneva Conventions.
Interpreting the Manual in such a manner would be consistent
with the requirements of the treaties as well as the Supreme
Court's treatment of international law in its jurisprudence. In
some cases, referencing the courts-martial procedures would be a
good step towards interpreting the Manual consistently. Failure
to implement proper fair trial protections may one day subject the
officials involved to prosecution overseas, threaten the safety of
U.S. soldiers in future conflicts, and damage the notion of justice
the United States has fought so hard to develop, protect, and
uphold.

